



Macro-Financial Stability and the Euro Philip R. Lane, Euro At 20 Conference

Two Lessons from Twenty Years of the Euro


- Avoid accumulation of excessive imbalances: pre-emptive use of fiscal and macroprudential policy tools
- ■Improve crisis management toolkit
- Focus on these topics
- ■Do not cover: ECB monetary policy; cross-border integration; political economy; income convergence


Outline

- ■Asymmetric Patterns during 1999-2008
- Counterfactuals?
- ■Crisis Dynamics during 2007-2012
- ■Reform Agenda
- Conclusions

Asymmetries During 1999-2007

- ■Differential exposures to global and technological forces
- Differential exposures to extra-EA shocks
- Differential initial conditions
- Differential domestic policy responses
- Focus on external imbalances







Analytical Issues

- ■Entry phase (1999-2001): Blanchard-Giavazzi interpretation
- ■Expansion during 2003-2008:
- Global credit boom
- Increased procyclicality (Lane and Pels 2012); Exceeded fundamentals-based norms (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012, 2015); Deterioration in fundamentals (Giavazzi and Spaventa 2011, Benigno and Fornaro 2014)
- "Sudden stop" risk versus soft landing scenarios



External Adjustment During the Crisis

- Severe drops in output and consumption
- ■Cross-country incidence of crisis strongly correlated with excessive initial imbalances (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011, 2012, 2015)
- ■But: no differential "euro" impact compared to wider sample
- ■No differential real exchange rate pattern compared to wider sample
- ■Role of exchange rates in adjustment (Mussa 1990, Engel 2011, Berka et al 2017, Lane and Stracca 2018)



Counterfactual Scenarios

- More pro-active counter-cyclical use of national macroprudential and fiscal policies: Martin-Philippon (2017)
- ■"No monetary union" alternative benchmark: national Taylor rules?

Figure 2: Household Debt - Ireland

Macroprudential + Fiscal Counterfactual Scenario






Figure 3. Output - Ireland

Figure 3b: Macroprudential + Fiscal Counterfactual Scenario



National Interest Rates: Taylor Rules

Counterfactual Taylor Rule Interest Rates





The Euro and the Crises of 2007-2012

- ■Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: buffering role of eurosystem liquidity
- ■Doom Loop Crisis of 2010-2012: exposed institutional flaws in institutional framework (sovereign-banking linkages; role of ECB in forestalling redenomination speculation)

Institutional Design of European Monetary Union

- ■Institutional framework for national fiscal policies: precondition for ESM, banking union and OMT
- ■ESM: rollover risk in a monetary union
- ■Banking Union: eliminate fragmentation; stabilising for cyclical shocks; mitigates doom loop dynamics; Capital Markets Union: debt markets; equity markets (relation to product market integration)
- ■Improved macroprudential toolkit



Fiscal Union?

- ■ECB, ESM, European Commission: existing fiscal linkages
- Central Fiscal Capacity (CFC) for macroeconomic stabilisation
- Shocks versus Policy Errors?
- Temporary shocks: national fiscal policies; Permanent shocks: cross-country insurance; Private equilibrium insufficient: macroeconomic factors (Farhi and Werning 2017)
- Non-Linear Scheme; "Usage Premiums"



Debt Issuance

- **SBBS**
- ■Ring-Fenced, Limited-Purpose Entities: ESM; CFC?
- Eurobonds
- Hybrid Schemes (Leandro and Zettelmeyer 2018)
- ■Implications for national sovereign bond markets

Wage Negotiations

- Revisit potential of national component in wage determination (Blanchard 2018)
- Tricky to organise but potential gains
- Lane (2010): two-part wage contracts (Irish public sector pay process)

Conclusions

- Convergence in diagnosis: but research agenda still very open
- Euro Area: unique construct
- ■Future evolution of institutional design: political backing required for cross-border risk sharing
- Implementation challenge: making effective use of enhanced policy toolkit