

Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Guidelines for the Financial Sector

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1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Guidelines for the Financial Sector ("the Guidelines") is to assist credit and financial institutions ("Firms") in understanding their AML/CFT obligations under Part 4 of the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 ("CJA 2010").

The Guidelines set out the expectations of the Central Bank of Ireland ("Central Bank") regarding the factors that Firms should take into account when identifying, assessing and managing ML/TF risks.

1.2 Status

The Guidelines do not constitute secondary legislation. Firms must always refer directly to the CJA 2010 when ascertaining their statutory obligations. The Guidelines do not replace or override any legal and/or regulatory requirements. In the event of a discrepancy between the Guidelines and the CJA 2010, the CJA 2010 will apply. The Guidelines are not exhaustive and do not set limitations on the steps to be taken by Firms to meet their statutory obligations.

The Guidelines should not be construed as legal advice or legal interpretation. It is a matter for Firms to seek legal advice if they are unsure regarding the application of the CJA 2010 to their particular set of circumstances.

For convenience to the user, from time to time, certain text from the CJA 2010 may be directly quoted in italics or otherwise summarised in the Guidelines. For the avoidance of doubt, such quotes or references are contained in blue text boxes. If any inconsistencies occur between the text in the Guidelines and the CJA 2010, the CJA 2010 prevails. References to sections of legislation within the Guidelines should be taken as references to the CJA 2010 unless otherwise stated.

Where the Guidelines have not provided guidance on a specific section from Part 4 of the CJA 2010, it is because that section of the CJA 2010 already provides clear and detailed information on the obligations of Firms and further guidance is unnecessary. The Guidelines also seek to highlight where the CJA 2010 has been materially amended since the initial publication of the Guidelines on 6 September 2019.

Where lists or examples are included in the Guidelines, such lists or examples are non-exhaustive. The examples present some, but not the only, ways in which Firms might comply with their obligations. The Guidelines do not take the place of a Firm performing its own assessment of the manner in which it shall comply with its statutory obligations. The Guidelines are not a checklist of things that all Firms must do or not do in order to reduce their ML/TF risk, and should not be used as such by Firms.

The Guidelines are not the only source of guidance on ML/TF risk. Firms are reminded that other bodies produce guidance that may also be relevant and useful.

Nothing in the Guidelines should be read as providing an express or implied assurance that the Central Bank would defer or refrain from using its enforcement powers where a suspected breach of the CJA 2010 comes to its attention.

The Central Bank will update or amend the Guidelines from time to time, as appropriate.

1.3 Data Protection

Firms shall comply with their obligations under Part 4 of the CJA 2010 having regard to their obligations under data protection legislation. Article 6.1(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR) specifically allows for the lawful processing of personal data where "processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject". When processing personal data for the purposes of complying with an AML/CFT obligation, Firms should ensure that such processing is necessary and proportionate in order to comply with their AML/CFT obligations.

1.4 Glossary

The following terms are used throughout the Guidelines:

Act of 2018 Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

(Amendment) Act 2018

Act of 2021 Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

(Amendment) Act 2021

AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism

Beneficial European Union (Anti-Money Laundering: Beneficial Ownership **Ownership SIs** of Corporate Entities) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 110 of 2019) and

of Corporate Entities) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 110 of 2019) and European Union (Modifications of Statutory Instrument No. 110 of 2019) (Registration of Beneficial Ownership of Certain Financial Vehicles) Regulations 2020 (S.I. No. 233 of 2020)

respectively

Board means a Firm's Board of Directors within the State, or where no

such Board exists, such other management body or bodies within the State, which set the Firm's strategy, objectives and overall direction, and which oversee and monitor management decisionmaking, and include the person or persons who effectively direct

the business of the Firm

Central Bank The Central Bank of Ireland

CDD Customer Due Diligence

CJA 2005 Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005

CJA 2010 Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing)

Acts 2010 to 2021

CRS The Common Reporting Standard refers to the agreed global

standard for automatic exchange of financial account information in tax matters approved by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in February

2014

EBA European Banking Authority

EDD Enhanced Due Diligence

EEA European Economic Area

elDAS Regulation Electronic Identification Regulation (Regulation (EU) No.

910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23

July 2014)

Entity or Entities Refers to corporate or legal entities in the context of beneficial

ownership registers and may include Firms

ESAs European Supervisory Authorities (comprising the European

Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and European Securities and Markets

Authority)

EU European Union

FATF Financial Action Task Force

Firm(s) Credit or financial institution(s) (which now includes VASPs

pursuant to the Act of 2021) subject to the CJA 2010

FIU Ireland State Financial Intelligence Unit

FS International Financial Sanctions (restrictive measures)

FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Programme reports

FSRB FATF Style Regional Bodies

FTR Funds Transfer Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers of funds as supplemented by S.I. No.

608/2017 - European Union (Information Accompanying

Transfers of Funds) Regulations 2017

ML Money Laundering

MLRO Money Laundering Reporting Officer

ML/TF Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing

Regulations

2019

The European Union (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing)

Regulations 2019 (S.I. No 578 of 2019)

Relevant Third

Party

Those persons identified in Section 40. (1) (a) - (d) of the CJA

2010

Risk Factors GL Guidelines issued by the EBA in accordance with Articles 17 and

18(4) of 4AMLD on simplified and enhanced due diligence and the factors which credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk associated with individual

business relationships and occasional transactions

SDD Simplified Due Diligence

TF Terrorist Financing

VASP Virtual Asset Service Provider

3AMLD Third EU AML Directive (Directive 2005/60/EC of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005)

4AMLD Fourth EU AML Directive (Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015) (as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018)

5AMLD Fifth EU AML Directive (Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018)

Any term used in the Guidelines should be construed in accordance with its definition under the CJA 2010.

2. Legal and Regulatory Framework

2.1 LegislativeFramework

The Irish AML/CFT legislative framework is set out in the CJA 2010. This framework was updated with the enactment of the Regulations of 2019 and the transposition of 5AMLD into Irish law pursuant to the Act of 2021.

Part 4 of the CJA 2010 obliges Firms to put in place an effective, risk-based AML/CFT framework, which includes the application of a risk based approach, customer due diligence ("CDD") measures, reporting of suspicious transactions, governance, policies and procedures, record keeping and training.

2.2 Regulatory Framework

The Central Bank is the competent authority for the monitoring of Firms' compliance with the CJA 2010 and is responsible for taking reasonable measures to secure such compliance. The Central Bank is also the competent authority for monitoring compliance with the FTR.

2.3 International Framework

The FATF is the global standard setting body in the area of AML/CFT. It has set out standards or recommendations, which include the preventative (compliance) measures to be put in place to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF publishes guidance on the risk-based approach to AML/CFT (including sector specific guidance)¹.

The European Union (EU) enacts AML/CFT legislation (directives and regulations), which are either transposed or directly effective in national laws of Member States (including EEA countries).

The EBA plays an important role in taking steps to ensure that competent authorities and Firms apply European AML/CFT legislation effectively and consistently². Guidelines are published by the EBA and the Central Bank complies with EBA guidelines by incorporating them into supervisory processes and, where relevant, into these Guidelines.

As the Guidelines do not replace the guidance published by the EBA (and any guidance relevant to AML/CFT published by the ESAs) and FATF, Firms should ensure that they are familiar with and have regard to the guidance published by these bodies.

¹ https://www.fatf-gafi.org/

²http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/anti-money-laundering-and-e-money

3. Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

3.1 Money Laundering

Money Laundering means an offence as set out under Section 7 of the CJA 2010. It involves the intentional or reckless conversion of property, generated from "criminal conduct", so that the criminal origin of the property is difficult to trace.

Section 7(1) of the CJA 2010 provides that a person commits a [Money Laundering] offence in the State if:

- "(a) the person engages in any of the following acts in relation to property that is the proceeds of criminal conduct:
 - (i) concealing or disguising the true nature, source,
 location, disposition, movement or ownership of the property, or any rights relating to the property;
 - (ii) converting, transferring, handling, acquiring, possessing or using the property;
 - (iii) removing the property from, or bringing the property into, the State,

and

(b) the person knows or believes (or is reckless as to whether or not) the property is the proceeds of criminal conduct."

Section 7(2) of the CJA 2010 provides that a person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) commits an offence.

"Criminal conduct" is defined in Section 6 of the CJA 2010. This definition encompasses all offences whether minor or serious, summary or indictable.

Section 6 of the CJA 2010 defines Criminal Conduct as including:

"Conduct that constitutes an offence or conduct occurring in a place outside the State that constitutes an offence under the law of the place and would constitute an offence if it were to occur in the State"

"Proceeds of Criminal Conduct" is defined in Section 6 of the CJA 2010.

Section 6 of the CJA 2010 defines Proceeds of Criminal Conduct as:

"Any property that is derived from or obtained through criminal conduct, whether directly or indirectly or in whole or in part..."

3.2 Terrorist Financing

Terrorist Financing means an offence under Section 13 of the CJA 2005.

Section 13(1) of CJA 2005 provides that a person is guilty of a terrorist financing offence if:

- "in or outside the State, the person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully provides, collects or receives funds intending that they be used or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part in order to carry out—
- a) an act that constitutes an offence under the law of the State and within the scope of, and as defined in, any treaty that is listed in the annex to the Terrorist Financing Convention, or
- b) an act (other than one referred to in paragraph (a))
 - (i) That is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilianor to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, and
 - (ii) The purpose of which is, by its nature or context, to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do, or abstain from doing, any act."

Section 13(2) of CJA 2005 provides that a person who attempts to commit an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence.

4. Risk Management

4.1 Risk-Based Approach

Section 30A and 30B of the CJA 2010 require Firms to apply a risk-based approach when applying AML/CFT compliance measures.

Sections 30A and 30B also provide for the application of appropriate measures to higher risk customers or areas of business to combat ML/TF. However, it is recognised that resources are finite and must be allocated on a risk sensitive basis. Firms are obliged to understand the level of risk presented by a customer and to be in a position to apply a risk-based approach in their compliance programs.

4.1.1 De-risking

In applying a risk-based approach to their AML/CFT obligation, Firms should be cognisant of the importance and benefits of financial inclusion. A "zero tolerance" approach, or wholesale termination of business relationships with entire categories of customers, without an individual assessment and consideration of the risk posed, and due consideration of the measures that could mitigate such risks, is not consistent with the risk-based approach.

A Firm should not take a decision to terminate a business relationship with an individual customer, or cease to provide a particular financial product or service to a customer, unless the Firm has fully considered whether it could apply any additional enhanced measures to reduce the ML/TF risk in the continuation of the business relationship, or the provision of a particular financial product or service.

Following the exploration of any additional enhanced measures which a Firm may consider putting in place in order to reduce the ML/TF risk, if a Firm decides that they cannot sufficiently reduce the ML/TF risk posed to an acceptable level, the Firm should document fully its rationale for a decision to terminate a business relationship or to cease the provision of a particular product or service. This should include an analysis of the ML/TF risks presented, the additional measures it considered putting in place to mitigate such risks, and the reasons they were deemed insufficient, so that such decision can be reasonably justified.

4.2 Risk Assessments

Firms should have a detailed understanding of the ML/TF risks to which they are exposed. Under the CJA 2010 Firms are required to assess:

- The ML/TF risk which they are exposed to resulting from the nature and complexity of the Firm's Business ("Business Risk Assessment"); and
- The ML/TF risk which they are exposed to resulting from entering into a business relationship with a customer or performing an occasional transaction ("Customer/Transaction Risk Assessment").

Each risk assessment should consist of two distinct but related steps:

Identifying ML and TF risk factors; and

Assessing the identified ML and TFrisks in order to understand how to mitigate those risks

Firms should consider the inherent ML/TF risk which they are subjected to, and the quality of their controls and mitigants as part of their assessment of the level of residual ML/TF risk connected to their business and those associated with their customers or occasional transactions.

4.2.1 Business Risk Assessments

Section 30A of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to conduct a Business Risk Assessment

Section 30A(5) requires Firms to ensure that their Business Risk Assessment is approved by senior management

A Firm's Business Risk Assessment should identify the ML/TF risks, which the Firm is potentially exposed to and, in accordance with the Firm's risk based approach, outline where resources need to be prioritised in order to counter ML/TF.

As part of the process to document their Business Risk Assessments, Firms should also record any changes made to the Business Risk Assessment. This is so that the Firm and the Central Bank will understand the rationale for the changes made.

Firms should ensure that their Business Risk Assessment is tailored to their business and that it takes account of factors and risks specific to the Firm's business. Where a Firm's Business Risk Assessment is drawn up as part of a group-wide risk assessment, the Firm should consider whether the group-wide risk assessment is sufficiently granular and specific to reflect the Firm's business and the risks to which it is exposed.

A generic Business Risk Assessment that has not been adapted to the specific needs and business model of a Firm is unlikely to meet the requirements of Section 30A of the CJA 2010.

4.2.2 Connecting the Business Risk Assessment and Customer/Transaction Risk Assessment

Section 30B of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to have regard to the findings of their Business Risk Assessment to assist with informing them of the extent of the CDD measures, which a Firm is required to take with an individual customer or occasional transaction.

Firms should rely on their assessment of the risks inherent in their business to inform their risk-based approach to the identification and verification of an individual customer. This in turn should drive the level and extent of due diligence appropriate to that customer or occasional transaction.

4.2.3 Customer/Transaction Risk Assessment

Section 30B of the CJA 2010 also requires Firms to have regard to any relevant risk variables in order to determine the extent of customer due diligence to be applied to a particular customer or transaction.

Accordingly, Firms are required to identify which ML/TF risks they are, or would be, exposed to as a result of entering into, or maintaining, a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction.

Firms should gather sufficient information at the beginning of a business relationship and throughout the business relationship as determined by the level of ML/TF risk presented by a customer, and before carrying out an occasional transaction in order that they can be satisfied that, they have identified all relevant risk factors.

4.2.4 Sources

Section 30A (2) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms, when carrying out a Business Risk Assessment, to have regard to the following sources:

- The National Risk Assessment for Ireland on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing;
- Any guidance on risk issued by the Central Bank; and
- Any Guidelines issued to Firms by the ESAs in accordance with 4AMLD

In addition to the sources that Firms are required to have regard to under Section 30A(2), Firms should also use various relevant and reliable sources when carrying out their Business Risk Assessment (such sources may also be relevant when considering Customer/Transaction risk assessment), examples include:

- European Commission's Supra-national Risk Assessment;
- European Commission's list of high-risk third countries;
- National Risk Assessment of the other jurisdiction(s) in which the Firm operates or customers of a Firm are located;
- Communications issued by FIU Ireland;
- Risk Factors contained in Schedule 3 and 4 to the CJA 2010;
- Guidance, circulars and other communication from the Central Bank and other relevant regulatory bodies;
- Information from industry bodies;
- Information from international standard setting bodies such as Mutual Evaluation Reports ("MERs") or thematic reviews;
- Regulatory Technical Standards and Opinions issued by the ESAs;
- EU Measures, including financial sanctions and designation of high risk countries;
- Information from international institutions and standard setting bodies relevant to ML/TF risks (e.g. UN, IMF, Basel, FATF); and

 Other credible and reliable sources that can be accessed individually or through commercially available databases or tools that are determined necessary by a Firm on a risk-sensitive basis.

4.3 Risk Factors

Section 30A.(1) of the CJA 2010 sets out the risk factors Firms are required to take into account when conducting their Business Risk Assessment. The risk factors must be relevant to the Firm's business and include consideration of at least the following; customer; products and services; types of transaction carried out; countries or geographic areas and delivery channels.

Firms should take a holistic view of the risk(s) associated with any given situation and note that unless required by the CJA 2010 or EU legislation, the presence of isolated risk factors does not necessarily move a relationship into a higher or lower risk category.

4.4 Customer Risk

When identifying the risk associated with their customers, including their customers' beneficial owners, Firms should consider the risk related to:

- The customer's and the customer's beneficial owner's business or professional activity;
- The customer's and the customer's beneficial owner's reputation insofar as it informs the Firm about the customer's or beneficial owner's financial crime risk; and
- The customer's and the customer's beneficial owner's nature and behaviour, including whether this could indicate an increased TF risk.

4.4.1 Customer's Business or Professional Activities

Firms should consider the risk factors associated with a customer's or their beneficial owner's business or professional activity including for example (recognising that each of these factors will not be relevant to every customer), whether the customer or its beneficial owner:

- Has political connections, for example:
 - o the customer or its beneficial owner is a Politically Exposed Person ("PEP") or has any other relevant links to a PEP; or
 - One or more of the customer's directors are PEPs and if so, these PEPs exercise significant control over the customer or beneficial owner³;
- Has links to sectors that are commonly associated with higher corruption risk, such as construction, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, arms trade and defense, extractive industries, and public procurement;
- Has links to sectors that are associated with higher ML or TF risk, for example certain Money Service Businesses, casinos or dealers in precious metals;
- Has links to sectors that involve significant amounts of cash;

³Where a customer or their beneficial owner is a PEP, Firms must always apply enhanced due diligence measures in line with Section 37 of the CJA 2010.

- Is a legal person or a legal arrangement and if so, the purpose of their establishment and the nature of their business;
- Holds another prominent position or enjoys a high public profile that might enable them to abuse this position for private gain. For example, they are:
 - Senior local or regional public officials with the ability to influence the awarding of public contracts;
 - Decision-making members of high profile sporting bodies;
 - Individuals that are known to influence the government and other senior decisionmakers; or
- Is a public body or state owned entity from a jurisdiction with high levels of corruption.

Other risk factors that Firms may consider in relation to a customer's business or professional activity include, for example, whether:

- The customer is a legal person subject to enforceable disclosure requirements that
 ensure that reliable information about the customer's beneficial owner is publicly
 available. For example, a public company listed on a regulated market or other trading
 platform that makes such disclosure a condition for listing and/or admission to trading;
- The customer is a credit or financial institution acting on its own account from a jurisdiction with an effective AML/CFT regime. For example whether:
 - o It is supervised for compliance with local AML/CFT obligations; and
 - If so supervised, there is no evidence that the customer has been subject to supervisory sanctions or enforcement for failure to comply with AML/CFT obligations or wider conduct requirements in recent years; or
- The customer's background is consistent with what the Firm knows about it. For example:
 - Its former, current or planned business activity;
 - The turnover of the business;
 - Its source of funds; and
 - o The customer's or beneficial owner's source of wealth.

4.4.2 Customer's Reputation

Risk factors that Firms should consider, where appropriate, when assessing the risks associated with a customer's or their beneficial owner's reputation include, for example whether:

- There are adverse media reports or other relevant information sources about the customer or its beneficial owner. For example, there are reliable and credible allegations of criminality or terrorism against the customer or their beneficial owners. Firms should determine the credibility of allegations interalia based on the quality and independence of the source data and the persistence of reporting of these allegations. Firms should note that the absence of criminal convictions alone may not be sufficient to dismiss allegations of wrongdoing;
- The customer, beneficial owner or anyone publicly known to be closely associated with them has currently, or had in the past, their assets frozen due to administrative or criminal proceedings or allegations of terrorism or terrorist financing;
- The customer or beneficial owner has been the subject of a suspicious transactions report by the Firm in the past; or
- The Firm has in-house information about the customer's or their beneficial owner's

integrity, obtained for example, in the course of a long-standing business relationship.

4.4.3 Customer's or Beneficial Owner's Nature and Behaviour

Risk factors that Firms should consider, where appropriate, when assessing the risk associated with a customer's or their beneficial owner's nature and behaviour include, for example, whether:

- The customer is unable to provide robust evidence of their identity⁵;
- The Firm has doubts about the veracity or accuracy of the customer's or beneficial owner's identity;
- There are indications that the customer is seeking to avoid the establishment of a business relationship. For example, the customer wishes to carry out a number of separate wire transfers, or other service, without opening an account, where the opening of an account with a Firm might make more economic sense;
- The customer's ownership and control structure appears unnecessarily complex or opaque and there is no obvious commercial or lawful rationale for such structures;
- The customer has nominee shareholders, where there is no obvious reason for having these;
- The customer is a special purpose vehicle ("SPV") or structured finance company where beneficial ownership is not transparent;
- There are frequent or unexplained changes to a customer's legal, governance or beneficial ownership structures (e.g., to its board of directors);
- The customer requests transactions that are complex, unusually or unexpectedly large or have an unusual or unexpected pattern without apparent economic or lawful purpose or a sound commercial rationale;
- There are grounds to suspect that the customer is trying to evade specific thresholds such as those set out under the definition of "occasional transaction" under the CJA 2010:
- The customer requests unnecessary or unreasonable levels of secrecy. For example, the customer is reluctant to share CDD information, or appears to disguise the true nature of its business;
- The customer's or beneficial owner's source of wealth or source of funds cannot be easily and plausibly explained. For example through its occupation, inheritance or investments;
- The customer does not use the products and services it has taken out as expected when the business relationship was first established;
- The customer is a non-resident and its needs could be better serviced elsewhere. For example, there is no apparent sound economic and/or lawful rationale for the customer requesting the type of financial service sought in this jurisdiction⁶;

https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1359456/EBA-Op-2016-07+%28Opinion+on+Customer+Due+Diligence+on+Asylum+Seekers%29.pdf

⁴ Firms should note that not all of these risk factors will be apparent at the outset but may emerge only once a business relationship has been established

⁵ Firms should note that there may be legitimate reasons that a customer may be unable to provide robust evidence of their identity, for example if the customer is an asylum seeker, the EBA has issued an 'Opinion on the application of Customer Due Diligence Measures to customers who are asylum seekers from higher risk third countries and territories', see

⁶ Article 16 of Directive 2014/92/EU creates a right for customers who are legally resident in the EU to obtain a basic payment account, but this right applies only to the extent that credit institutions can comply with their AML/CFT obligations. See, in particular, Articles 1(7) and 16(4) of Directive 2014/92/EU

- The customer is a non-profit organisation whose activities put them at a heightened risk of being abused for terrorist financing purposes; or
- The customer is insensitive to price or significant losses on investments.

Risk factors associated with the customer or beneficial owner's nature or behaviour, which may indicate an increased TF risk, especially when other TF risk factors are also present may include, whether:

- The customer or beneficial owner is publicly known to be under investigation for terrorist activity or has been convicted for terrorist activity or is known to have close personal or professional links to such persons;
- The customer performs transactions involving the incoming and outgoing of fund transfers from and/or to countries where groups committing terrorist offences are known to be operating;
- The customer is a not for profit organisation:
 - Whose activities or leadership have been publicly known to be associated with extremists or terrorist sympathisers; or
 - Whose transaction behaviour involves bulk transfers of large amounts of funds to jurisdictions associated with higher ML/TF risk and high-risk third countries;
 - Whose transactions are characterised by large flows of money in a short period of time, involving non-profit organisations with unclear links;
 - o Who intends to transfer funds to:
 - named persons included on lists of persons, groups or entities involved in terrorist acts and subject to EU Financial Sanctions or are known to have close personal or professional links to persons registered on such lists; or
 - persons, groups or entities publicly known to be under investigation for terrorist activity or who have been convicted for terrorist activity or are known to have close personal or professional links to such persons.

4.5 Country or Geographic Risk

Country or Geographic Risk relates to:

- Jurisdictions in which the customer is based or where the customer and beneficial owner is resident;
- Jurisdictions which are the customer's and beneficial owner's main places of business;
 and
- Jurisdictions to which the customer and beneficial owner appear to have relevant personal or business links, legal or financial interests, of which the Firm should reasonably have been aware.

When identifying the risk associated with countries and geographic areas, Firms should consider for example the risk factors related to:

- The nature and purpose of the business relationship within the jurisdiction;
- The effectiveness of the jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime;
- The level of predicate offences relevant to money laundering within the jurisdiction;
- The level of ML/TF risk associated with the jurisdiction;
- Any economic or financial sanctions against a jurisdiction; and
- The level of legal transparency and tax compliance within the jurisdiction.

4.5.1 Nature and Purpose of the Business Relationship within the Jurisdiction

The nature and purpose of the business relationship will often determine the relative importance of individual country and geographic risk factors. Risk factors Firms should consider, where appropriate, include for example:

- Where the funds used in the business relationship have been generated abroad, the level of predicate offences relevant to money laundering and the effectiveness of a country's legal system;
- Where funds are received from or sent to jurisdictions where groups committing terrorist offences are known to be operating, the extent to which this is expected or might give rise to suspicion is based on what the Firm knows about the purpose and nature of the business relationship;
- Where the customer is a credit or financial institution, the adequacy of the country's AML/CFT regime and the effectiveness of AML/CFT supervision; or
- For customers other than natural persons, the extent to which the country in which the customer (and where applicable, the beneficial owner/s) is registered, effectively complies with international tax transparency standards.

4.5.2 Effectiveness of Jurisdiction's AML/CFT Regime

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with the effectiveness of a jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime include, for example, whether:

• The country has been identified by the European Commission as having strategic

deficiencies in their AML/CFT regime, under Article 9 of 4 AMLD7; or

- There is information from one or more credible and reliable sources about the quality
 of the jurisdiction's AML/CFT controls, including information about the quality and
 effectiveness of regulatory enforcement and oversight. Examples of possible sources
 include:
 - Mutual Evaluations of the FATF or (FSRB)⁸;
 - The FATF's list of high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions;
 - International Monetary Fund assessments; and
 - o FSAP.

Firms should identify lower risk jurisdictions in line with the ESA's Risk Factor GLs and Schedule 3 to the CJA 2010.

4.5.3 Level of Jurisdiction's Predicate Offences

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with the level of predicate offences relevant to money laundering in a jurisdiction include, for example, whether:

- There is information from credible and reliable public sources about the level of
 predicate offences relevant to money laundering, for example corruption, organised
 crime, tax crime or serious fraud. Examples include corruption perceptions indices;
 OECD country reports on the implementation of the OECD's anti-bribery convention;
 and the UNODC World Drug Report; or
- There is information from more than one credible and reliable source about the
 capacity of the jurisdiction's investigative and judicial system effectively to investigate
 and prosecute these offences.

4.5.4 Level of Jurisdiction's TF Risk

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the level of TF risk associated with a jurisdiction include, for example, whether:

- There is information, for example, from law enforcement or credible and reliable open media sources, suggesting that a jurisdiction provides funding or support for terrorist activities or that groups committing terrorist offences are known to be operating in the country or territory; or
- There is information, for example from law enforcement or credible and reliable open media sources, suggesting that groups committing terrorist offences are known to be operating in the country or territory.
- The jurisdiction is subject to financial sanctions, embargoes or measures that are related to terrorism, financing of terrorism or proliferation issued, for example, by the United Nations and the EU.

4.5.5 Level of Jurisdiction's Transparency and Tax Compliance

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the jurisdiction's level of

 $^{^7}$ Article 18 (1) of 4AMLD provides that if Firms deal with natural or legal persons resident or established in third countries that the European Commission has identified as presenting a high money laundering or terrorist financing risk, Firms must always apply enhanced due diligence measures

⁸ Firms should note that membership of the FATF or an FSRB, e.g. MoneyVal, does not, of itself, mean that the jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime is adequate and effective.

transparency and tax compliance include, for example, whether:

- There is information from more than one credible and reliable source that the country has been deemed compliant with international tax transparency and information sharing standards and there is evidence that relevant rules are effectively implemented in practice. Examples of possible sources include:
 - Reports by the OECD's Global Forum on Transparency and the Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which rate jurisdictions for tax transparency and information sharing purposes;
 - Assessments of the jurisdiction's commitment to automatic exchange of information based on the CRS;
 - Assessments by the FATF of the jurisdiction's compliance with FATF Recommendations 9.24 and 25 and Immediate Outcomes 2 and 5°; or
 - FSRB or IMF assessments (for example IMF staff assessments of Offshore Financial Centres);
- The jurisdiction is committed to, and has effectively implemented, the CRS on Automatic Exchange of Information, which the G20 adopted in 2014; and
- The jurisdiction has put in place reliable and accessible beneficial ownership registers.

4.6 Products, Services and Transactions

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with their products, services or transactions, include, for example:

- The level of transparency, or opaqueness, the product, service or transaction affords;
- The complexity of the product, service or transaction; and
- The value or size of the product, service or transaction.

4.6.1 Transparency of Products, Services or Transactions Risk

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with the transparency of products, services or transactions include, where appropriate, for example:

- The extent to which products or services facilitate, or allow anonymity or opaqueness
 of customer, ownership or beneficiary structures that could be used for illicit purposes,
 for example:
 - o Pooled accounts, bearer shares, fiduciary deposits, offshore and certain trusts;
 - o Legal entities structured in a way to take advantage of anonymity; and
 - o Dealings with shell companies or companies with nominee shareholders;
- The extent to which is it possible for a third party that is not part of the business relationship to give instructions, for example, certain correspondent banking relationships.

4.6.2 Complexity of Products, Services or Transactions

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risks associated with a product, service or transaction's complexity include, where appropriate, for example:

 The extent that the transaction is complex and involves multiple parties or multiple jurisdictions, for example, certain trade finance transactions;

 $^{^9\,}http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/?hf=10\&b=0\&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)$

- Conversely, the extent that the transaction is straightforward, for example, regular payments into a pension fund;
- The extent that the products or services allow payments from third parties or accept overpayments. Where third party payments are permitted, the extent to which:
 - The Firm can identify the third party and understands their relationship with the customer, for example a state welfare body; and
 - Products and services are funded primarily by fund transfers from the customer's own account at another financial institution that is subject to AML/CFT standards and oversight comparable to those required under 4AMLD;
- The risks associated with new or innovative products or services, in particular where this involves the use of new technologies or payment methods.

4.6.3 Value and Size of Products, Services or Transactions

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with the value or size of a product, service or transaction include, where appropriate, for example:

- The extent that products or services may be cash intensive, for example, certain types of payment services and current accounts; and
- The extent that products or services facilitate or encourage high value transactions, for example there are no caps on certain transaction values or levels of premium that could limit the use of the product or service for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes.

4.7 Channel/Distribution Risk

When identifying the risk associated with Channel/ Distribution, Firms should consider the risk factors related to:

- The extent that the business relationship is conducted on a non-face to face basis; and
- Any introducers or intermediaries the Firm utilises and the nature of their relationship to the Firm.

4.7.1 How the Business Relationship is Conducted

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with how the business relationship is conducted, include for example, whether:

- The customer is physically present for identification purposes. If they are not,
 - Has the customer deliberately avoided face-to-face contact other than for reasons of convenience or incapacity?
 - Whether the Firm uses reliable forms of non-face to face CDD; and
 - The extent that the Firm has taken steps to prevent impersonation or identity fraud.

4.7.2 Channels used to introduce Customer to the Firm

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with customers introduced to the Firm, include for example, whether:

- The customer has been introduced from other parts of the same financial group and if so,
 - The extent that the Firm can rely on this introduction as reassurance that the customer will not expose the Firm to excessive ML/TF risk; and
 - The extent that the Firm has taken measures to satisfy itself that the group entity

applies CDD measures equivalent to EEA standards in line with Section 57 of the CJA 2010:

- The customer has been introduced from a third party, for example a bank that is not part of the same group. In such instances, whether that third party is a credit or financial institution or their main business activity is unrelated to financial service provision
- Where the customer has been introduced by a third party, the extent of the measures that the Firm has undertaken to be satisfied whether the:
 - The third party is a regulated person subject to AML/CFT obligations consistent with those set out under 4AMLD;
 - The third party is subject to effective AML supervision and there are no indications that the third party's level of compliance with applicable AML legislation or regulation is inadequate, for example because the third party has been sanctioned for breaches of AML/CFT obligations;
 - The third party applies CDD measures and keeps records equivalent to EEA standards and that it is supervised for compliance with comparable AML/CFT obligations in line with Section 40 (1) of the CJA 2010;
 - The third party will provide, immediately upon request, relevant copies of identification and verification data, among others in line with Section 40 (4) (b) of the CJA 2010;
 - The quality of the third party's CDD measures is such that it can be relied upon;
 and
 - The level of CDD applied by the third party is commensurate to the ML/TF risk associated with the business relationship.

4.7.3 Use of Intermediaries

Risk factors that Firms should consider when assessing the risk associated with the use of intermediaries, include for example, whether the intermediary is:

- A regulated person subject to AML obligations that are consistent with those of the 4AMLD;
- Subject to effective AML supervision and there are no indications that the
 intermediary's level of compliance with applicable AML legislation or regulation is
 inadequate, for example, because the intermediary has been sanctioned for breaches
 of AML/CFT obligations;
- Involved on an ongoing basis in the conduct of business and whether this affects the Firm's knowledge of the customer and ongoing risk management;
- Based in a jurisdiction associated with higher ML/TF risk. Where an intermediary is based in a high risk third country that the European Commission has identified as having strategic deficiencies, Firms should not rely on that intermediary. Reliance may be placed on an intermediary where it is a branch or majority-owned subsidiary of another Firm established in the EU, and the Firm is confident that the intermediary fully complies with group-wide policies and procedures.

4.8 Assessing ML/TFrisk

Firms should take a holistic view of the ML/TF risk factors they have identified that, together, will determine the level of ML/TF risk associated with a business relationship or transaction.

4.8.1 Weighting Risk Factors

As part of this assessment, Firms should consider whether to weight risk factors differently depending on their relative importance.

When weighting risk factors, Firms should make an informed judgment about, and document the relevance of different risk factors in the context of a business relationship or transaction. The weight given to each of these factors is likely to vary from product to product and customer to customer (or category of customer) and from one Firm to another. When weighting risk factors Firms should ensure that:

- Weighting is not unduly influenced by just one factor;
- Economic or profit considerations do not influence the risk rating;
- Weighting does not lead to a situation where it is impossible for any business relationship to be classified as high risk;
- Situations identified by 4AMLD or national legislation as always presenting a high money laundering risk cannot be over-ruled by the Firm's weighting, for example a correspondent relationship with a Firm outside of the EEA must apply enhanced customer due diligence; and
- Firms are able to override any automatically generated risk scores where necessary.
 The rationale for the decision to override such scores should be governed and documented appropriately.

Where Firms use automated IT systems to allocate overall risk scores to categorise business relationships or transactions and does not develop these in house, rather purchases them from an external provider, they should ensure that:

- The Firm fully understands the risk rating methodology and how it combines risk factors to achieve an overall risk score;
- The methodology used meets the Firm's risk assessment requirements and legislative obligations; and
- The Firm is able to satisfy itself that the scores allocated are accurate and reflect the Firm's understanding of ML/TF risk.

4.8.2 Categorising Business Relationships and Occasional Transactions

Following their risk assessment, Firms should categorise their business relationships and occasional transactions according to the perceived level of ML/TF risk.

Firms should decide on the most appropriate way to categorise risk¹⁰. This will depend on the nature and size of the Firm's business and the types of ML/TF risk to which it is exposed.

The steps Firms take to identify and assess ML/TF risk across their business should be proportionate to the nature and size of each Firm.

 $^{^{10}\}mbox{For example Firms may categories risk as high, medium and low, or variations of the similar ratings$

4.8.3 Monitoring and Review of Risk Assessment

Section 30A. (4) of the CJA 2010 provides that a Firm:

".... shall keep the business risk assessment, and any related documents, up to date in accordance with its internal policies, controls and procedures..."

Firms should keep their Business Risk Assessment and assessments of the ML/TF risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions as well as of the underlying factors under review to ensure their assessment of ML/TF risk remains up to date and relevant. Where the Firm is aware that a new risk has emerged, or an existing one has increased, this should be reflected in Business Risk Assessment as soon as possible.

Firms should assess information obtained as part of their ongoing monitoring of a business relationship and consider whether this affects the risk assessment.

4.8.4 Emerging ML/TF risks

Firms should ensure that they have systems and controls in place to identify emerging ML/TF risks and that they can assess these risks and, where appropriate, incorporate them into their Business Risk Assessments and Customer/Transaction Risk Assessments in a timely manner.

Examples of systems and controls Firms should put in place to identify emerging risks include:

- Processes to ensure that internal information is reviewed regularly to identify trends and emerging issues;
- Processes to ensure that the Firm regularly reviews relevant information from sources such as:
 - The Irish National Risk Assessment;
 - The European Commission's Supra-national RiskAssessment;
 - European Commission's list of high-risk third countries;
 - National Risk Assessment of the jurisdiction(s) in which the Firm operates or customers of a Firm are located;
 - Communications issued by FIU Ireland;
 - Guidance, circulars and other communication from the Central Bank and other relevant regulatory bodies;
 - o Information obtained as part of the initial CDD process;
 - The Firm's own knowledge and expertise;
 - Information from industry bodies;
 - Information from international standard setting bodies such as Mutual Evaluation Reports ("MERs") or thematic reviews;
 - Changes to terror alerts and sanctions regimes as soon as they occur, for example by regularly reviewing terror alerts and looking for sanctions regime updates;
 - Information from international institutions and standard setting bodies relevant to ML/TF risks (e.g. UN, IMF, Basel, FATF); and

- Other credible and reliable sources that can be accessed individually or through commercially available databases or tools that are determined necessary by a Firm on a risk-sensitive basis;
- Processes to capture and review information on risks relating to new products;
- Engagement with other industry representatives, competent authorities and FIU (e.g. round tables, conferences and training providers), and processes to feed back any findings to relevant staff¹¹; and
- Establishing a culture of information sharing and strong ethics within the Firm.

4.8.5 Updating of ML/TF Risk Assessment

Firms should put in place systems and controls to ensure their Business Risk Assessments and Customer/Transaction Risk Assessments remain up to date. Examples include:

- Setting a timeline on which the next risk assessment update will take place, to ensure changing, new or emerging risks are included in risk assessments. Where the Firm is aware that a new risk has emerged, or an existing one has increased, this should be reflected in risk assessments as soon as possible;
- Carefully recording issues throughout the year that could have a bearing on risk assessments, such as:
 - o Internal suspicious transaction reports;
 - o Compliance failures and intelligence from front office staff; or
 - Any findings from internal/external audit reports;

Like the original risk assessments, any update to a risk assessment and adjustment of accompanying CDD measures should be documented, proportionate and commensurate to the ML/TF risk.

 $^{^{11}\,\}text{Reference to staff includes officers/volunteers, depending on the type of financial institution}$

5. Customer Due Diligence

5.1 Application of Risk Assessment

Section 30B.(1) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to identify and assess the ML/TF risk in relation to a customer or particular transaction in order to determine the level of customer due diligence required under Sections 33 and 35 of the CJA 2010.

In carrying out the determination, Section 30B.(1) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to have regard to:

- "(a) the relevant business risk assessment,
- (b) the matters specified in Section 30A(2),
- (c) any relevant risk variables, including at least the following:
 - (i) the purpose of an account or relationship;
 - (ii) the level of assets to be deposited by a customer or the size of transactions undertaken;
 - (iii) the regularity of transactions or duration of the business relationship;
 - (iv) any additional prescribed risk variable,
- (d) the presence of any factor specified in Schedule 3 or prescribed under Section 34A suggesting potentially lower risk,
- (e) the presence of any factor specified in Schedule 4, and
- (f) any additional prescribed factor suggesting potentially higher risk"

Firms should document their determination under Section 30B. (1) of the CJA 2010 in writing and retain the determination in accordance with the Firm's record keeping policies and procedures. Where a Firm does not document their determination under Section 30B. (1) of the CJA 2010, the Central Bank may direct them to do so. A Firm, which fails to document a determination in accordance with a direction of the Central Bank under Section 30B. (2) of the CJA 2010, commits an offence and is liable to criminal prosecution.

5.2 Customer Due Diligence ("CDD")

Sections 33 to 39 of the CJA 2010 provide the CDD measures, which a Firm must take in order to comply with its obligations in respect of identifying and verifying customers, persons purporting to act on behalf of customers and beneficial owners.

In accordance with Section 33(1) of the CJA 2010, Firms are required to identify and verify customers and where applicable, beneficial owner(s):

- prior to the establishment of a business relationship with a customer;
- prior to carrying out an occasional transaction or service for a customer;
- prior to carrying out any service for a customer, if, having regard to the circumstances, the Firm has reasonable grounds to suspect that the customer is involved in, or the service, transaction or product sought by the customer is for the purpose of ML/TF;
- prior to carrying out any service for a customer where the Firm has reasonable grounds to doubt the veracity or adequacy of documents;
- at any time, including where the relevant circumstances of a customer have changed; and
- at any time where a Firm is obliged by virtue of any enactment or rule of law
 to contact a customer for the purposes of reviewing any relevant
 information relating to the beneficial owner connected with the customer.

The level of CDD measures, which a Firm is required to apply under Sections 33 to 39 of the CJA 2010 depends upon the nature of the relationship between the Firm and its customer, the type of business conducted and the perceived ML/TF risks arising.

Section 33(5) of the CJA 2010 allows a Firm to identify and verify the identity of a customer during the establishment of a business relationship in circumstances where the Firm believes there is no real risk of ML/TF. However, per Section 33(6) of the CJA 2010, while the account may be opened prior to CDD being complete, transactions may not be carried out by or on behalf of the customer or beneficial owner until CDD is complete.

Section 33(8)(a) of the CJA 2010 prohibits Firms that are unable to identify and verify a customer due to the failure of that customer to provide the necessary documentation or information, from providing any service or carrying out any transactions sought by that customer while the documentation or information required remains outstanding.

Section 33(8)(b) of the CJA 2010 provides that Firms must separately and distinctly take action to discontinue the business relationship with the customer in such circumstances.

The Central Bank has not included prescriptive / definitive examples of documentation that it considers would satisfy customer identification and verification requirements. Firms, in applying a risk-based approach, should maintain their own lists of documents, which they will accept, in satisfaction of this obligation and in accordance with relevant

national and international laws and standards and taking into account other obligations such as financial inclusion and data protection. Such lists should be subject to review, to ensure that they remain current and appropriate, taking into account, among other things, a Firm's evolving processes, adoption of new technology, and any relevant external or environmental factors (e.g. pandemic).

CDD involves more than just verifying the identity of a customer. Firms should collect and assess all relevant information in order to ensure that the Firm:

- Knows its customers, persons purporting¹² to act on behalf of customers and their beneficial owners, where applicable;
- Knows what it should expect from doing business with them; and
- Is alert to any potential ML/TF risks arising from the relationship.

Firms should consider the following steps when conducting CDD measures in relation to new and existing customers, products or services. The list is non-exhaustive and it is for each Firm to demonstrate its compliance with the obligations set out under the CJA 2010.

- Where CDD is completed during the establishment of the business relationship, the
 policies and procedures should specify the defined timeframe in which CDD must be
 completed. The duration of this defined timeframe should minimise the risk of being
 unable to contact the customer or return the funds to the original source, should there
 be a requirement to discontinue the business relationship;
- Where the Firm has reasonable grounds to doubt the adequacy and veracity of CDD documentation and information held on file for a customer.
- Ensuring that contractual arrangements for new customers adhere to the statutory obligations as prescribed by Section 33 (8) (a) and (b) of the CJA 2010. In relation to the circumstances that would result in the discontinuance of the business relationship and the subsequent effect of such discontinuance, customers should be advised or notified in advance as part of the on-boarding process; and
- Implement processes that allows the Firm to return funds directly to the source from which they came, where appropriate. Firms should exercise caution when considering the means of doing this, so as not to appear to convert or legitimise such funds. Firms should also consider whether there is any cause for suspicion of ML/TF in circumstances where CDD is not forthcoming, and ensure suspicious transaction reporting obligations are fulfilled as required. It is important that at all times, Firms act in the best interest of the customer (or prospective customer), while protecting the integrity of the financial system by preventing it being used for money laundering or financing terrorism, while exhausting all possible avenues before taking any actions that might disadvantage a customer.

5.2.1 Documentation and Information

Evidence of identity can take a number of forms. Firms should set out in their policies and procedures the documents and information which they are willing to accept and the circumstances under which they are willing to accept them in order to identify and verify

 $^{^{12}}$ Persons acting on behalf of the customer may include Power of Attorney cases, Executor/Administrator, Ward of court, vulnerable customer who has a third party acting on their behalf via formal authorisation

the identity of a customer¹³. The amendment to the CJA 2010 under the Act of 2021 broadens the sources of information, which can be used by Firms to identify and verify a customer's identity to explicitly include information from relevant trust services as specified in the eIDAS Regulation.

Firms should retain records evidencing identity in either paper or electronic format.

5.2.2 Beneficial Ownership

Section 33(2) (b) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to:

- identify any beneficial owner(s) connected with a customer or service;
 and
- take measures reasonably warranted due to the ML/TF risk to verify the beneficial owner's identity

to the extent necessary to ensure that the Firm has reasonable grounds to be satisfied that the Firm knows who the beneficial owner is and in the case of certain legal structures, to understand the ownership and control structure of the entity or arrangement concerned. Where the beneficial owner is the senior managing official referred to in Article 3(6) (a) (ii) of 4AMLD, Firms are required to take the necessary measures to verify the identity of that person and retain records of the actions taken to verify that person's identity including any difficulties encountered in the verification process.

With regard to Section 33(2) (b) of the CJA 2010, Firms should:

- Compile documented assessments determining scenarios where beneficial ownership may be a factor with regard to the provision of products and services offered by the Firm¹⁴; and
- Assess and document:
 - the degree of verification required regarding the beneficial owners depending on the associated ML/TF risk attaching to such beneficial owners;
 - o the procedures to be applied in these circumstances; and
 - o where relevant, measures taken to identify a beneficial owner and any difficulties encountered in establishing a beneficial owner's identity.

Firms should note that there is an obligation to identify all beneficial owners. In addition, Firms are required to verify the identity of beneficial owners by taking those measures reasonably warranted by a risk based approach following an assessment of the ML/TF risks presented by the customer.

In complying with their obligations to identify and verify the identity of a customer's beneficial owner(s), and in circumstances where a senior managing official(s) has been

¹³ Where appropriate, Firms should also document their approach to accepting alternative documentation to support financial inclusion.

¹⁴ an example of this could be accounts held by minors

listed as a customer's beneficial owner(s), Firms should establish whether their customer has in fact exhausted all possible means to identify their beneficial owner(s).

Prior to the establishment of a business relationship, Firms are required to confirm that information concerning the beneficial ownership of a customer is entered in the following registers, where applicable:

- The express trust (beneficial ownership) register (in accordance with Section 35(3A) of the CJA 2010;
- The Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Companies and Industrial Provident Societies or, as the case may be, the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership of Irish Collective Assetmanagement Vehicles, Credit Unions and Unit Trusts (in accordance with Section 35(3C) of the CJA 2010.

Notwithstanding the obligation contained under Section 35 (3A) or (3C) of the CJA 2010, a Firm may allow an account to be opened by its customer prior to confirming that the required information has been entered on the relevant register. However, in accordance with Section 35 (3B) or (3D) of the CJA 2010 the Firm shall ensure that no transactions in connection with the account are carried out on behalf of the customer or beneficial owner until it is established that the beneficial ownership information is entered into the relevant beneficial ownership register.

Where Firms avail of the provisions of Section 35(3B) and/or 35(3D) of the CJA 2010, they should document and retain their reasons for doing so. Where they are unable to confirm that the required beneficial ownership information is entered into the relevant beneficial ownership register, Firms should be aware of their obligations under Section 33(8) of the CJA 2010 in this regard (please see section 5.2 of the Guidelines for further information). Firms should be aware that a transaction includes the receipt of funds from a potential customer. The return of funds received prior to an account being opened for a potential customer by a Firm could be used by a money launderer as part of the layering phase of the money laundering process.

5.2.3 Beneficial Ownership Registers

4AMLD introduced an obligation for Member States to establish Registers of Beneficial Ownership for Entities¹⁵. The purpose of these Registers is to deter ML/TF by making it more difficult for natural persons to hide their ownership and control of Entities by ensuring that the natural person(s) that is the ultimate beneficial owner(s)/controller(s) of Entities are identified, and that this information is readily accessible to law enforcement, regulators and designated persons (including Firms).

In addition, 4AMLD obliges Entities to maintain their own internal register of beneficial ownership information. This is separate from the requirement to provide the same beneficial ownership information to the relevant central Beneficial Ownership Register.

These obligations are transposed into Irish law under the Beneficial Ownership SIs.

In order to be an effective tool to prevent and detect ML/TF, it is important for Entities to understand that a beneficial owner can be a natural person that ultimately controls an Entity by direct means (such as, without limitation, by owning a sufficient percentage of shares or voting rights in the Entity), or via other means (such as, without limitation, control for the purpose of preparing consolidated financial statements, through a shareholders' agreement, or through the exercise of dominant influence or the power to appoint senior management).

Entities should not list the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s) as their beneficial owner(s) (either in their internal beneficial ownership register, or in the information that they submit to the Registrar of their relevant central Beneficial Ownership Register), unless:

- they have first exhausted all possible means to identify a natural person(s) who is a beneficial owner(s) as defined in Article 3(6) of 4AMLD; or
- there is any doubt that the natural person(s) identified are in fact the beneficial owner(s) as defined in Article 3(6) of 4AMLD.

Entities are obliged to keep records of the actions taken in order to identify their beneficial owner(s).

¹⁵ The Registrar of Companies and the Central Bank are responsible for two separate Registers of Beneficial Ownership for Entities. The Revenue Commissioner will be responsible for a separate Register of Beneficial Ownership of certain trusts and similar arrangements.

5.2.4 Establishment of a Business Relationship

Section 33(1) (a) of the CJA 2010, requires Firms to to identify and verify the identity of a customer or beneficial owner prior to establishing a business relationship with the customer.

However, Section 33(5) of the CJA 2010 allows Firms to identify and verify the identity of a customer or beneficial owner during the establishment of a business relationship, where a Firm reasonably believes that:

- (a) Verifying the identity of the customer or beneficial owner(as the case may be) prior to the establishment of the relationship would interupt the normal conduct of business; and
- (b) There is no real risk that the customer is involved in, or the service sought by the customer is for the purpose of, money laundering or terrorist financing".

In such circumstances, Firms must take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the customer or beneficial owner as soon as practicable.

Section 33(6) of the CJA 2010 allows for circumstances where an account may opened prior to CDD being complete, however, transactions may not be carried out by or on behalf of the customer or beneficial owner until CDD is complete.

Where Firms avail of the provisions of Section 33(5) of the CJA 2010, they should document and retain their reasons for doing so. Where they are unable to take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the customer or beneficial owner, Firms should be aware of their obligations under Section 33(8) of the CJA 2010 in this regard.

5.2.5 Purpose and Nature of the Business Relationship

Section 35(1) of the CJA 2010, requires Firms to obtain information reasonably warranted by the ML/TF risk on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship with a customer prior to the establishment of the relationship.

Firms are required to obtain sufficient information about their customers in order to adequately monitor their activity and transactions and to satisfy themselves that the account is operating in line with the intended purpose.

Firms should identify the most appropriate information necessary to satisfy their obligations under Section 35(1) of the CJA 2010. Depending on the type of customer, the information might include, for example:

- Information concerning the customer's or beneficial owner's business or occupation/employment;
- Information on the types of financial products or services which the customer is looking for;
- Establishing the source of funds in relation to the customer's anticipated pattern of transactions;
- Establishing the source of wealth of the customer (particularly for high risk customers);
- Copies of the customer's most recent financial statements;
- Establishing any relationships between signatories and customers;
- Any relevant information pertaining to related third parties and their relationships with/to an account for example, beneficiaries; or
- The anticipated level and nature of the activity that is to be undertaken through the business relationship, which may include the number, size and frequency of transactions that are likely to pass through the account.

While Firms are obliged under Section 35(1) of the CJA 2010 to obtain information on the purpose and nature of the business relationship at the outset of the relationship, the reliability of this profile should increase over time as the Firm learns more about the customer, their use of products/accounts and the financial activities and services that they require.

Firms should ensure they review any known information on the customer and monitor their transactions/activity, in order to ensure they understand the potentially changing purpose and nature of the business relationship.

5.2.6 Use of Innovative Solutions

Firms should note that the CJA 2010 is technology neutral with regard to the sources, which a Firm can use in order to comply with its CDD obligations under the CJA 2010.

Where a Firm utilises such innovative or so-called "RegTech" solutions (collectively referred to here as 'RegTech solution') to assist with their AML/CFT obligations the Firm should:

- fully understand the impact the RegTech solution has on the Firm's regulatory compliance;
- ensure that the RegTech solution can achieve compliance for the Firm with its relevant AML/CFT obligations when the RegTech solution goes live;
- ensure that the RegTech solution is capable of being audited by an independent third party; and
- undertake a compliance risk assessment of the RegTech solution on an annual basis either independently of, or incorporated into, the Firm's annual AML/CFT risk assessment.

Firms remain responsible at all times for ensuring that the utilisation of the RegTech solution complies with the Firm's regulatory obligations. Firms utilising such RegTech solutions should also have regard to the Joint Committee of the ESAs *Opinion on the use of innovative solutions by credit and financial institutions* when complying with their CDD obligations ¹⁶.

5.2.7 Reliance on Other Parties to carry out CDD

Section 40(3) of the CJA 2010, provides that Firms can rely on certain relevant third parties ("Third Party" or "Third Parties") as set out under Section 40 subsections (1) (a) to (d) of the CJA 2010 to complete CDD measures required under Section 33 or 35(1) of the CJA 2010.

Section 40(4) of the CJA 2010 provides that Firms may rely on a Third Party to apply the measures under Section 33 or 35(1) of the CJA 2010 only if:

- there is an arrangement in place between the Firm and the Third Party confirming that the Third Party accepts being relied upon; and
- the Firm is satisfied, that the Third Party is a person that is supervised
 or monitored for compliance with the requirements specified under
 4AMLD, or requirements equivalent to those under 4AMLD, and on
 the basis of the arrangement, the Third Party will forward to the Firm,
 as soon as practicable after a request from the Firm, any CDD
 documents or information, including any information from relevant
 trust services as set out in the eIDAS Regulation, relating to the
 customer obtained by the Third Party.

Section 40(5) of the CJA 2010 provides that Firms that rely on a Third Party to apply measures under Section 33 or 35(1) of the CJA 2010 remain liable for any failure to apply the measure.

When placing reliance on Third Parties to undertake CDD, Firms should ensure that:

- The arrangement should have clear provisions in respect of obligations between the Firm and the Third Party, where the Third Party has formally consented to being relied upon and the Firm is satisfied, that the Third Party is a person that is supervised or monitored for compliance with the requirements specified under 4AMLD, or requirements equivalent to those under 4AMLD, and on the basis of the arrangement, the Third Party will provide the Firm with the underlying CDD documentation or information, including any information from relevant trust services as set out in the eIDAS Regulation, in a timely manner upon request. In the absence of such an arrangement, the provisions of Section 40(4) of the CJA 2010 do not apply and the Firm should itself carry out the necessary CDD;
- The signed agreement should have clear contractual terms in respect of the obligations of the Third Party to obtain and maintain the necessary records, and to provide the Firm with CDD documentation or information upon request. The signed agreement should not contain any conditional language, whether explicit or implied, which may result in the inability of the Third Party to provide the underlying CDD documentation or information upon request. Examples of such conditional language include (but are

not limited to) terms such as 'to the extent permissible by law', 'subject to regulatory request' etc.;

- The Firm's policies and procedures set out an approach with regard to the identification, assessment, selection and monitoring of Third Party relationships, including the frequency of testing performed on such Third Parties;
- The Firm only relies on the Third Party to carry out CDD measures required by Section 33 and 35(1) of the CJA 2010. Firms may not rely on the Third Party to fulfil the ongoing monitoring requirements, which they are obliged to conduct as warranted by the risk of their underlying customers, as prescribed by Section 35(3) of the CJA 2010. Firms should note that they cannot rely on the third party to perform the EDD measures or provide senior management approval. However, the relevant third party may provide assistance to the Firm in gathering the necessary documentation or information to establish the source of wealth and source of funds:
- The Firm conducts regular assurance testing to ensure documentation can be retrieved without undue delay, and that the quality of the underlying documents obtained is sufficient; and
- The Firm ensures that it has fully satisfied itself that, in placing such reliance, it can
 meet its obligations under the CJA 2010 prior to placing reliance upon a Third Party
 based in jurisdictions known for banking secrecy or similarly restrictive legislation.

Firms should note that placing reliance on a Third Party in accordance with Section 40(3) of the CJA 2010 does not include a situation where a Firm has appointed another entity to apply the necessary measures as an outsourcing service provider, intermediary, or an agent of the Firm. In such cases, the outsourced service provider, intermediary, or agent may actually obtain the appropriate verification evidence in respect of the customer but the Firm remains responsible for ensuring compliance with the obligations contained with the CJA 2010.

See also Section 5.6.1. C of the Guidelines regarding Third Party Reliance for PEPs.

5.3 Ongoing Monitoring

Section 35(3) of the CJA 2010, requires Firms to monitor any business relationship that it has with a customer to the extent reasonably warranted by the risk of ML/TF.

Section 54 of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to adopt internal policies, controls and procedures in relation to their business, to prevent and detect the commission of ML/TF. In particular, Section 54(3) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to adopt internal policies, controls and procedures dealing with a number of matters, including:

- the monitoring of transactions and business relationships;
- the identification and scrutiny of complex or large transactions, unusual
 patterns of transactions that have no apparent economic or visible
 lawful purpose and any other activity that the Firm has reasonable
 grounds to regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to
 money laundering or terrorist financing; and
- measures to be taken to keep documents and information relating to risk assessments by the Firm up to date.

When assessing CDD obligations in relation to the on-going monitoring of customers, Firms should ensure that they have effective and appropriate on-going monitoring policies and procedures that are in place, in operation and adhered to by all staff. Such policies and procedures should include at a minimum:

- Full review and consideration of all trigger events associated with their customers. Clear examples of trigger events ¹⁷ that are understood by staff and targeted training should be provided for staff on how to identify possible trigger events and interpret these. Trigger events should also be reviewed on a regular basis by the Firm and examples revised where appropriate;
- A well-documented and well-established monitoring programme, which is demonstrative of a risk-based approach, where high-risk customers are reviewed on a frequent basis;
- Periodic reviews of customers, the frequency of which is commensurate with the level of ML/TF risk posed by the customer. Firms should also ensure that staff are provided with specific training on how to undertake a periodic review;
- Reassessment and, if applicable, re-categorisation of customers upon material updates to CDD information and/or other records gathered through a trigger event or periodic review;

 17 Definitive lists of trigger events may lead to complacency within the Firm, as staff may not be open to suspicious activity outside of the listed triggers. Rather Firms should list examples of trigger events, which should provoke staff to 'think outside the box'.

- Re-categorisation of customers as high risk subject to senior management approval and the completion of Enhanced Due Diligence¹⁸ before a decision is taken to continue the relationship;
- Screening undertaken of all customers to identify new and on-going PEP relationships.
 The frequency of such screening should to be determined by the Firm, commensurate with the Firm's Business Risk Assessment;
- Clear instruction for staff regarding the action required where appropriate CDD documentation or information is not held on file. Such instruction should include the steps that may be taken to locate or obtain such documentation or information 19; and
- Proactive utilisation of customer contact as an opportunity to update CDD information.

5.3.1 Monitoring Complex or Unusual Transactions

Section 36A. (1) of the CJA 2010, requires Firms to, as far as possible, in accordance with their adopted policies and procedures examine the background and purpose of all transactions that:

- (a) are complex,
- (b) are unusually large,
- (c) conducted in an unusual pattern, or
- (d) do not have an apparent economic or lawful purpose.

Firms should note that the criteria listed at (a) to (d) above apply on an individual, rather than cumulative, basis.

Section 36A.(2) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to increase the degree and nature of monitoring of a business relationship in order to determine whether transactions referred to in Section 36A.(1) appear suspicious.

Firms should attempt to establish the rationale for changes in behaviour and take appropriate measures, for example conducting additional due diligence or if warranted, submitting a suspicious transaction report to FIU Ireland and the Revenue Commissioners.

See also Section 5.8 of the Guidelines below regarding complex or unusual transactions

5.3.2 Transaction Monitoring

As discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.3.1 of these Guidelines, Firms are required to monitor customer transactions in order to identify transactions that may be suspicious in nature, and that the intensity of the monitoring should increase with the complexity and scale of

 $^{^{\}rm 18}$ Enhanced Due Diligence is discussed further in section 5.5 of the Guidelines

¹⁹ Where it is necessary to write to customers to seek relevant documentation or information, such communications must clearly detail what is being requested and why, as well as the potential consequences for the customer of failure to provide such documentation or information, as specified in Section 33(8) of the CJA 2010 which are discussed in further detail in section 5.2 above.

those transactions so that the risk of ML/TF is factored into the transaction monitoring process.

Where Firms have deployed Transaction Monitoring controls to meet their obligations under the CJA 2010, they should ensure that these controls are effective and that the controls detect what suspicious activity looks like in the context of the Firm's business activities and also in the context of the Firm's specific customer profile(s). As such, the controls should be tailored to the Firm's Business Risk Assessment (see Section 4.2.1 of these Guidelines), and the Customer/Transaction Risk Assessment (see section 4.2.3 of these Guidelines).

By using the Business Risk Assessment, a Firm can determine the appropriate transaction monitoring solution for its specific business activities. An automated transaction monitoring system will not always be possible or appropriate based on the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm's business. However, in many cases, an automated transaction monitoring solution will be necessary. If a Firm determines that a manual process is adequate, the decision should be based upon a full assessment of the manual controls ability to detect suspicious transactions, including unusual patterns of transactions. Such decision should be documented and approved by senior management within the Firm. In addition, the controls should be fully documented in the policies and procedures, and included in the risk assessment.

While the use of an automated transaction monitoring solution is desirable, a Firm should not place absolute reliance on any such system and employees should still be aware of the need to manually identify any transactional activity, which may be suspicious.

Firms should ensure connectivity between its customer (including beneficial owners where applicable) identification and verification processes, transaction monitoring, and STR processes. A Firm should have sufficient and up to date information on file and obtained during the customer identification and verification process to determine whether transactional activity is suspicious.

Firms should ensure that the adequacy of its controls are subject to continued and regular review. If an automated system is employed, the rules, scenarios, and thresholds should be regularly reviewed and tested to ensure that they continue to detect identified risks and emerging risks.

Firms should ensure that there is a mechanism for making changes to the controls to take into account altering risks and new risk indicators, for example due to a significant external event like a pandemic. The Firm's transaction monitoring levels may need to be recalibrated to reflect the impact upon the economy and changes to patterns of customer behaviour brought about by the particular external event.

Firms should ensure that, when using an automated solution, that may be proprietary or provided by an affiliated or third party entity, a full assessment as to its suitability for the risks inherent to the Firm's specific business, including jurisdictional considerations, is completed. The Firm should be able to effect changes to the configuration of the transaction monitoring controls as necessary, and the controls should be fully reflective of the risks identified in the Firm's Business Risk Assessments and Customer/Transaction Risk Assessments.

Firms can no longer avail of the exemptions previously contained in Section 34 and 36 of the CJA 2010, as these sections have been repealed. A new section 34 (A) of the CJA 2010 has been introduced.

Section 34A(1) of the CJA 2010 provides that Firms may take SDD measures to such extent and at such times as is reasonably warranted by the lower ML/TF risk in relation to a business relationship or transaction where the Firm:

- "(a) identifies in the relevant business risk assessment an area of lower risk into which the relationship or transaction falls; and
- (b) considers that the relationship or transaction presents a lower degree of risk".

Section 34A(2) of the CJA 2010 provides that prior to applying the measures under Section 34A(1) of the CJA 2010, Firms are required to conduct appropriate testing to satisfy themselves that the customer, business relationship or transaction qualifies for the simplified treatment,

Section 34A (3) of the CJA 2010 provides that where a Firm has applied SDD measures in accordance with Section 34A(1) of the CJA 2010, it is required to:

- "(a) keep a record of the reasons for its determination and the evidence on which it was based; and
- (b) carry out sufficient monitoring of the transactions and business relationships to enable the [Firm] to detect unusual or suspicious transactions."

5.4.1 SDD measures which Firms may apply to Business Relationships or Transactions

Firms should identify the most appropriate SDD measures to apply to business relationships or transactions in accordance with their policies and procedures. SDD measures, which Firms may apply, include but are not limited to:

- Adjusting the timing of CDD where the product or transaction sought has features that limit its use for ML/TF purposes, for example by:
 - Verifying the customer's or beneficial owner's identity during the establishment of the business relationship; or
 - Setting defined thresholds or reasonable time limits, above or after which the identity of the customers or beneficial owners must be verified. In such circumstances, Firms should make sure that:
 - This does not result in a de facto exemption from CDD;
 - They have systems or processes²⁰ in place to detect when the threshold or time limit has been reached; and

²⁰ Such systems and processes may be manual or automated in nature.

- They do not defer CDD or delay obtaining relevant information about the customer where applicable legislation, for example FTR or provisions in national legislation, require that this information be obtained at the outset;
- Adjusting the quantity of information obtained for identification, verification or monitoring purposes, for example by:
 - Verifying identity on the basis of information obtained from one reliable, credible and independent document or data source only; or
 - Assuming the nature and purpose of the business relationship because the product is designed for one particular use only, such as a company pension scheme;
- Adjusting the quality or source of information obtained for identification, verification or monitoring purposes, for example by:
 - Accepting information obtained from the customer rather than an independent source when verifying the beneficial owner's identity (note that this is not permitted in relation to the verification of the customer's identity);
 - Relying on the source of funds to meet some of the CDD requirements, where the risk associated with all aspects of the relationship is very low, for example where the funds are state benefit payments;
 - Adjusting the frequency of CDD updates and reviews of the business relationship, depending on the level of risk associated with that customer; or
 - Adjusting the frequency and intensity of transaction monitoring, for example by monitoring transactions above a certain threshold only. Where Firms choose to do this, they should ensure that the threshold is set at a reasonable level and that they have systems in place to identify linked transactions that, together, would exceed that threshold.

When applying SDD measures, Firms should obtain sufficient information to enable them to be reasonably satisfied that their assessment that the ML/TF risk associated with the relationship is low is justified. Firms should obtain sufficient information about the nature of the business relationship to identify any unusual or suspicious transactions. Firms should note that SDD does not exempt it from reporting suspicious transactions to the FIU Ireland and the Revenue Commissioners.

If Firms adjust the amount, timing or type of each or all of the SDD measures undertaken, then such adjustment should be commensurate with the low level of ML/TF risk, which the Firms have identified.

5.5 Enhanced Customer Due Diligence ("EDD")

Sections 37 to 39 of the CJA 2010 prescribes a number of circumstances in which Firms are required to apply EDD measures, including the following:

- Where the customer, or the customer's beneficial owner, is a politically exposed person (PEP);
- Where a Firm enters into a correspondent relationship with a respondent institution from a non-EEA state;
- Where a Firm deals with a customer (whether a natural person or legal entity) established in high-risk third countries; and
- To a business relationship or transaction that they have identified as presenting a higher degree of risk.

Firms should apply risk proportionate levels of EDD measures in those situations where it is commensurate to the ML/TF risk they have identified. In circumstances in which a Firm has determined that customers or business scenarios present a higher ML/TF risk, EDD measures should be applied. Firms should also ensure that they clearly document their rationale for applying EDD measures. For example:

- Firms should ascertain whether they have obtained adequate information regarding
 the customer and the customer's business in the context of the service they are
 providing to the customer, to form a basis for a reliable and comprehensive assessment
 of the risks arising.
 - If the information is not adequate, Firms should seek additional documentation, which may include, for example:
 - Establishing a customer's source of wealth/source of funds; and/or
 - Additional information regarding the customer and/or service, including additional CDD information in any case where the Firm has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of information previously obtained.
- Firms should apply an enhanced level of ongoing monitoring to their business with the
 customer, as appropriate to their assessment of the ML/TF risk arising from the
 business with that customer. Firms should review the level of that monitoring on a
 regular basis to ensure that it remains risk-appropriate.

Firms should apply EDD measures in higher risk situations to manage and mitigate those risks appropriately. EDD measures cannot be substituted for CDD measures but must be applied in addition to CDD measures.

5.6 EDD in relation to Politically Exposed Persons ("PEPs")

Section 37 of the CJA 2010 requires the identification of PEPs and the application of EDD measures to PEPs.

The PEP regime in Ireland includes all PEPs, irrespective of residency, including PEPs from Ireland.

Individuals who have or have had, a high political profile, or hold or have held, public office, or are currently performing or have performed a prescribed function (as determined by the Minister for Justice) can pose a higher money laundering risk to Firms as their position may make them vulnerable to corruption. This risk, and therefore EDD requirements for PEPs, also extends to members of their immediate families and to known close associates.

Firms should note that PEP status itself is intended to apply higher vigilance to certain individuals and put those individuals that are customers or beneficial owners into a higher risk category. It is not intended to suggest that such individuals are involved in suspicious activity.

Section 37 of the CJA 2010 provides a definition of persons who are classified as PEPs and the steps which Firms must undertake to determine whether any of the following are PEPs, immediate family members of a PEP or a close associate(s) of a PEP:

- a customer or beneficial owner connected with the customer or service concerned; or
- a beneficiary of a life assurance policy or other investment related assurance policy; or
- a beneficial owner of the beneficiary.

Firms are required to undertake the steps:

- prior to the establishment of a business relationship;
- prior to carrying out an occasional transaction, or
- prior to the pay out of a life assurance policy or the assignment, in whole or in part, of such a policy.

The steps to be taken by Firms under Section 37 of the CJA 2010 should reflect the level of risk that the customer or beneficial owner is involved in money laundering or terrorist financing.

In demonstrating compliance with the obligations set out under Section 37 of the CJA 2010, Firms should undertake the measures outlined in Sections 5.6.1 to 5.6.4 below.

5.6.1 Policies and Procedures in relation to PEPs

A. PEP Identification

Firms should put appropriate policies and procedures in place to determine:

- If a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP at on boarding; or
- If a customer becomes a PEP during the course of the business relationship with the Firm.

Firms should note that new and existing customers may not initially meet the definition of a PEP, but may subsequently become one during the course of a business relationship with the Firm. On this basis, Firms should undertake regular and on-going screening of their customer base and the customers' beneficial owners (where relevant), to ensure that they have identified all PEPs. The frequency of PEP screening should be determined by Firms commensurate with their Business Risk Assessment.

B. Management of PEPS

Firms' policies and procedures should address how any PEP relationships identified will be managed by the Firm including:

- Application of EDD measures to PEPs, including determining Source of Wealth and Source of Funds;
- Obtaining senior management Approval; and
- Enhanced on-going monitoring measures.

C. Reliance on Third Parties in relation to PEPs

Firms should also have appropriate policies and procedures in place in instances where the Firm is relying upon a Third Party to perform the due diligence measures on customers and beneficial owners. The policies and procedures should set out the steps to be taken by the Firm when the Third Party has identified a new PEP relationship.

Firms should note that they cannot rely on the Third Party to perform the EDD measures or provide senior management approval. However, the Third Party may provide assistance to the Firm in gathering the necessary documentation or information to establish the source of wealth and source of funds.

See also Section 5.2.6 of the Guidelines regarding reliance on Third Parties.

5.6.2 Senior Management Approval of PEPs

Section 37(4) (a) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to ensure that approval is obtained from senior management before a business relationship is established or continued with a PEP.

Firms should put appropriate policies and procedures in place clearly setting out:

- The reporting and escalation of PEP relationships to senior management (up to and including the Member of Senior Management (as defined in section 6.3 below), where relevant and appropriate);
- The timelines for obtaining senior management sign-off; and
- The level of seniority required in order to approve a PEP relationship.

The Firm must allocate responsibility for the approval of PEP relationships, and must ensure that the approval of a PEP relationship is conducted by individuals who are appropriately skilled and empowered, and this process is subject to appropriate oversight. Firms should determine the level of seniority for sign-off by the level of increased ML/TF risk associated with the business relationship. The Senior Manager approving a PEP business relationship should have sufficient seniority and oversight to take informed decisions on issues that directly impact the Firm's ML/TF risk profile.

When considering whether to approve a PEP relationship, Firms should take into consideration:

- The level of ML/TF risk that the Firm would be exposed to if it entered into that business relationship; and
- What resources the Firm would require in order to mitigate the risk effectively.

Where Firms are considering whether to enter into, or to continue to carry on a business relationship with a PEP, they should ensure that:

- the matter is discussed at senior management level;
- the corresponding ML/TF risks are acknowledged; and
- the decision reached is documented.

5.6.3 Source of Wealth / Source of Funds of PEPs

Section 37(4) (b) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms determine the source of wealth and funds for the following transactions in relation to PEPs

"(i) transactions the subject of any business relationship with the customer that are carried out with the customer or in respect of which a service is sought, or

(ii) any occasional transaction that the designated person carries out with, for or on behalf of the customer or that the [Firm] assists the customer to carry out."

Firms should take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, which are to be used in the business relationship in order to satisfy themselves that they do not handle the proceeds of corruption or other criminal activity.

The measures, which Firms should take to establish a PEP's source of wealth and source of funds will depend on the degree of risk associated with the business relationship. Firms should verify the source of wealth and the source of funds based on reliable and independent data, documents or information.

When determining the source of wealth and source of funds, Firms should, at least consider:

- The activities that have generated the total net worth of the customer (that is, the
 activities that produced the customer's funds and property); and
- The origin and the means of transfer for funds that are involved in the transaction (for example, their occupation, business activities, proceeds of sale, corporate dividends).

5.6.4 Enhanced On-going monitoring of PEPs

Section 37(4) (c) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to apply enhanced monitoring of the business relationship with PEPs.

This is in addition to the monitoring required under Section 35(3) of the CJA 2010 in order to identify any unusual transactions by PEPs.

Section 37(4A) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to continue to apply the measures set out in Section 37(4) to a PEP for as long as is reasonably required until the person is no longer deemed to pose a risk, arising from their previous PEP status.

Firms should regularly review the information they hold on PEP customers and their beneficial owners (where relevant) to ensure that any new or emerging information that could affect the risk assessment is identified in a timely fashion. The frequency of ongoing monitoring should be determined by the Firm commensurate with the higher risk associated with the PEP relationship.

5.7 EDD in Relation to Correspondent Relationships

Section 38 of the CJA 2010 sets out the EDD requirements Firms are required to undertake in relation to correspondent relationships involving the execution of payments with another credit institution or financial institution, where the respondent institution is situated in a non-Member State.

Correspondent relationships include correspondent relationships between credit institutions and between credit and financial institutions, including relationships established for securities transactions or funds transfers. Correspondent relationships also applies to relationships where there may be no underlying third party customer for example relationships between and among credit and financial institutions acting on a principal-to-principal basis.

Where a correspondent institution processes and executes transactions on behalf of customers of a respondent institution, the correspondent institution often faces a heightened level of ML/TF risk due to the correspondent institution not having a direct relationship with the customer of the respondent institution.

Reference to correspondent relationships in this section shall have the meaning given to it under the CJA 2010.

A correspondent institution's policies and procedures should adequately address all of its obligations as set out under Section 38 of the CJA 2010. Firms may also find this section useful in respect of correspondent relationships within Member States. A Firm may apply differing levels of CDD to such correspondent relationships in accordance with the Firms' own risk assessment.

5.7.1 Risk Assessment of Correspondent Relationships

Section 38 (1) (a) to (f) of the CJA 2010 provides that the correspondent institution shall not enter into a correspondent relationship unless, prior to commencing the relationship, the correspondent institution:

- (a) "has gathered sufficient information about the respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the business of the respondent institution,
- (b) is satisfied on reasonable grounds, based on publicly available information, that the reputation of the respondent institution, and the quality of supervision or monitoring of the operation of the respondent institution in the place, are sound,
- (c) is satisfied on reasonable grounds, having assessed the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing controls applied by the respondent institution, that those controls are sound.
- (d) has ensured that approval has been obtained from the senior management of the institution,
- (e) has documented the responsibilities of each institution in applying antimoney laundering and anti-terrorist financing controls to customers in the conduct of the correspondent relationship and, in particular –
 - (i) the responsibilities of the institution arising under this Part, and
 - (ii) any responsibilities of the respondent institution arising under requirements equivalent to those specified in the Fourth Money Laundering Directive,

and

- (f) in the case of a proposal that customers of the respondent institution have direct access to a payable-through account held with the institution in the name of the respondent institution, is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the respondent institution
 - (i) has identified and verified the identity of those customers, and is able to provide to the institution, upon request, the documents (whether or not in electronic form) or information used by the institution to identify and verify the identity of those customers,
 - (ii) has applied measures equivalent to the measure referred to in section 35(1) in relation to those customers, and
 - (iii) is applying measures equivalent to the measure referred to in section 35(3) in relation to those customers.

Correspondent institutions should perform risk assessments of all correspondent relationships. The risk assessment of the respondent institution should take into account a number of risk factors including but not limited to:

- The jurisdiction in which the respondent institution is incorporated in and the AML/ CFT regulatory regime which the respondent institution is subject to;
- The ownership and management structure of the respondent institution, including any role performed by or influenced by beneficial owners or PEPs;
- The business purpose of the relationship;
- Operations and transaction volumes;
- The correspondent institution's customer base;
- The quality of the respondent institution's AML/CFT systems and controls; and
- Any negative information known about the respondent institution or its affiliates.

The conclusion of the risk assessment should determine the appropriate risk rating attaching to a particular respondent institution and drive the level of EDD applied and the frequency of relationship review.

5.7.2 Senior Management Approval of Respondent Relationships

Section 38(1) (d) of the CJA 2010 requires the senior management of the correspondent institution to approve correspondent relationships

The correspondent institution should be able to evidence that appropriate consideration has been given to maintain or exit a particular correspondent relationship. Correspondent institutions should document and retain all approvals by senior management for all new correspondent relationships and reviews of existing correspondent relationships (see 5.6.2 in relation to senior management approval for PEPs).

5.7.3 Responsibilities of each Party regarding Respondent Relationships

Section 38(1) (e) of the CJA 2010 requires the correspondent institution to document ...

"the responsibilities of each institution in applying anti-money laundering and antiterrorist financing controls to customers in the conduct of the correspondent relationship and, in

particular-

- (i) the responsibilities of the institution arising under this Part, and
- (ii) any responsibilities of the respondent institution arising under requirements equivalent to those specified in the Fourth Money Laundering Directive."

Correspondent institutions should have policies and procedures in place which ensure that the respective responsibilities of the correspondent institution and respondent institution in applying AML/CFT controls is documented, prior to the establishment of the correspondent relationship.

5.7.4 Correspondent Relationships in connection with Shell Banks

Correspondent institutions should have policies and procedures in place, which ensure that:

- The correspondent institution does not enter into a correspondent relationship with a respondent institution that is a shell bank; or
- The respondent institution, with whom it has entered into a correspondent relationship, does not have a relationship with a shell bank.

5.7.5 Liaison with Respondent Institutions

Correspondent institutions should appoint a member of senior management, the Compliance Officer, or the MLRO to:

- Liaise with and discuss any potential AML/CFT issues with the respondent institution;
- Obtain the necessary CDD information; and
- If necessary, conduct an onsite visit to the respondent institution's offices as part of the correspondent institution's CDD measures.

5.7.6 Screening of Respondent Institutions

Correspondent institutions should regularly screen respondent institutions, their controllers, beneficial owners and any other connected persons, to identify for PEP connections or persons, or affiliated or subsidiary entities subject to financial sanctions.

5.7.7 Information Requirements for Correspondent Relationships

Correspondent institutions should ensure that sufficient information is obtained on all respondent relationships and particularly for any respondent relationship where EDD is applied. Information obtained for a respondent institution may include, but is not limited to, the following:

- Jurisdiction where the respondent institution is located (Member State or Non Member State);
- Ownership/control structure (e.g. publicly listed entity);
- Structure and experience of the Board of Directors/Executive management;
- Information from respondent's website and respondent's latest annual return;
- Reputation of respondent institution and regulatory status;
- Respondent's AML/CFT controls.

5.7.8 Ongoing monitoring of Correspondent Relationships

The respondent institution is in effect a customer of the correspondent institution and as such, as required under Section 35 of the CJA 2010, the correspondent institution must apply on-going monitoring measures pursuant to the level of ML/TF risk presented by the correspondent relationship.

Correspondent institutions should perform periodic reviews on a regular basis, with higher risk correspondent relationships reviewed more frequently, but at least on an annual basis. In addition, the following non-transactional trigger events should be considered:

- Material change in ownership and/or management structure within the respondent institution;
- Re-classification of the jurisdiction where the respondent institution is located by the European Commission or FATF;
- Identification of a PEP relationship associated with the respondent institution;
- Identification of adverse media on the respondent institution;
- Correspondent institutions should conduct transaction monitoring on the respondent institution and the associated underlying transactions.

5.7.9 Unusual Transactions in Correspondent Relationships

Correspondent institutions should put in place adequate policies and procedures to detect unusual transactions or patterns of transactions. The following examples are illustrative of possible suspicious transactional respondent activity:

- Transactions involving higher risk countries vulnerable to Money Laundering and/or Terrorist Financing;
- Transactions with those respondent institutions already identify as higher risk;
- Large (volume or value) transaction activity involving monetary instruments (e.g. money orders, bank drafts), especially involving instruments that are sequentially numbered;
- Transaction activity that appears unusual in the context of the relationship with the respondent institution;
- Transactions involving shell corporations;
- Transactions that are larger or smaller than the correspondent institution would normally expect based on its knowledge of the respondent institution, the business relationship and the risk profile of the respondent institution.

5.8 EDD in relation to Complex or Unusual Transactions

36A. (1) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to, in accordance with their adopted policies and procedures, examine the background and purpose of all complex or unusually large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose.

36A. (2) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to increase the degree and nature of monitoring of a business relationship in order to determine whether transactions referred to in subsection (1) appear suspicious.

Firms should put in place adequate policies and procedures to identify unusual transactions or patterns of transactions. Examples may include transactions or patterns of transactions that are:

- Larger than the Firm would normally expect based on its knowledge of the customer, the business relationship or the category to which the customer belongs;
- Of an unusual or unexpected pattern compared with the customer's normal activity or the pattern of transactions associated with similar customers, products or services; or
- Very complex compared with other similar transactions associated with similar customer types, products, or services; and the Firm is not aware of an economic rationale or lawful purpose or doubts the veracity of the information it has been given.

Where Firms detect unusual transactions or patterns of transactions, they should apply EDD measures sufficient to help the Firm determine whether these transactions give rise to suspicion. Such EDD measures should at least include:

- Taking reasonable and adequate measures to understand the background and purpose
 of these transactions, for example by establishing the source and destination of the
 funds or finding out more about the customer's business to ascertain the likelihood of
 the customer making such transactions; and
- Monitoring the business relationship and subsequent transactions more frequently and with greater attention to detail. A Firm may decide to monitor individual transactions where this is commensurate to the risk it has identified.

See also Section 5.3.1 of the Guidelines regarding the monitoring of large or unusual transactions.

5.9 EDD in relation to High-Risk Third Countries and other High-Risk Situations

Section 38A. (1) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to apply the following measures to manage and mitigate the ML/TF risk, in addition to those under Chapter 3 of the CJA 2010, when dealing with a customer established or residing in a high-risk third country:

- (a) Obtaining additional information on the customer and on the beneficial owner;
- (b) Obtaining additional information on the intended nature of the business relationship;
- (c) Obtaining information on the source of funds and source of wealth of the customer and of the beneficial owner;
- (d) Obtaining information on the reasons for the intended or performed transactions;
- (e) Obtaining the approval of senior management for establishing or continuing the business relationship;
- (f) Conducting enhanced monitoring of the business relationship by increasing the number and timing of controls applied and selecting patterns of transaction that need further examination

Section 39.(1) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to apply measures to manage and mitigate the ML/TF risk to a business relationship or transaction that presents a higher degree of risk.

The amendments to the CJA 2010 under the Act of 2021 (contained in Section 38A (1)) sets out more detailed enhanced due diligence measures which Firms must apply in the specific instance of dealing with a customer established or residing in a high-risk third country.

Firms, when dealing with customers in all other high-risk situations, should take an informed decision about which EDD measures are appropriate for these situations.

Firms should apply appropriate EDD, including the extent of the additional information sought and of the increased monitoring carried out, based on the reason(s) why the transaction or a business relationship is classified as high risk.

Apart from the specific EDD measures, which Firms are obliged to take when dealing with a customer established or residing in a high-risk third country, Firms should decide what EDD measures they deem appropriate. For example, in certain high-risk situations a Firm may deem it appropriate to focus on enhanced ongoing monitoring during the course of the business relationship as opposed to applying other or additional EDD measures. Below is a non-exhaustive list of EDD measures which a Firm may decide to take in order to mitigate the ML/TF risk.

- Seeking information about the customer's or beneficial owner's identity, or the
 customer's ownership and control structure, in order to be satisfied that the risk
 associated with the relationship is well understood. This may include obtaining and
 assessing information about the customer's or beneficial owner's reputation and
 assessing any negative allegations against the customer or beneficial owner. Examples
 include:
 - o Information about family members and close business partners;
 - Information about the customer's or beneficial owner's past and present business activities; and
 - Adverse media searches;
- Seeking information about the intended nature of the business relationship to ascertain that the nature and purpose of the business relationship is legitimate and to help Firms obtain a more complete customer risk profile. This may include obtaining information on:
 - The number, size and frequency of transactions that are likely to pass through the
 account, to enable the Firm to spot deviations that might give rise to suspicion (in
 some cases, requesting evidence may be appropriate);
 - Why the customer is looking for a specific product or service, in particular where it
 is unclear why the customer's needs cannot be met better in another way, or in a
 different jurisdiction;
 - The destination of funds;
 - The nature of the customer's or beneficial owner's business, to enable the Firm to better understand the likely nature of the business relationship;
- Increasing the quality of information obtained for CDD purposes to confirm the customer's or beneficial owner's identity including either:
 - Requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account verifiably in the customer's name with a bank subject to CDD standards that are not less robust than those set out in Chapter II of 4AMLD; or
 - Establishing that the customer's wealth and the funds that are used in the business relationship are not the proceeds of criminal activity and that the source of wealth and source of funds are consistent with the Firm's knowledge of the customer and the nature of the business relationship. In some cases, where the risk associated with the relationship is particularly high, verifying the source of wealth and the source of funds may be the only adequate risk mitigation tool. The source of funds or source of wealth may be verified, inter alia, by reference to VAT and income tax returns, copies of audited accounts, pay slips, property registration or independent media reports;
- Increasing the frequency of reviews to be satisfied that the Firm continues to be able to manage the risk associated with the individual business relationship, or conclude that the relationship no longer corresponds to the Firm's risk appetite or to help identify any transactions that require further review. Examples include:

- Increasing the frequency of reviews of the business relationship to ascertain whether the customer's risk profile has changed and whether the risk remains manageable;
- Obtaining the approval of senior management to commence or continue the business relationship to ensure that senior management are aware of the risk their Firm is exposed to and can take an informed decision about the extent to which the Firm is equipped to manage that risk;
- Reviewing the business relationship on a more regular basis to ensure any changes to the customer's risk profile are identified, assessed and where necessary, acted upon; or
- Conducting more frequent or in-depth transaction monitoring to identify any unusual or unexpected transactions that might give rise to suspicion of ML/TF. This may include establishing the destination of funds or ascertaining the reason for certain transactions.

Governance

6.1 Governance

The attitude and culture embedded within a Firm is of critical importance in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. A positive culture recognises the important public interest aspect of a Firm's role in the fight against ML/TF. This includes having an approach to AML/CFT compliance that considers the legislative obligations as only the starting point. Firms should engage with the Central Bank in a positive, transparent way and should be proactive in bringing matters to the attention of the Central Bank.

Insufficient or absent AML/CFT risk management, governance, policies, controls and procedures exposes Firms to significant risks, including not only financial but also reputational, operational and compliance risks.

Firms should ensure that the ML/TF risk management measures adopted by the Firm are risk-based and proportionate, informed by the firm's Business Risk Assessment of its ML/TF risk exposure and in compliance with the CJA 2010.

Firms should ensure that the AML/CFT roles and responsibilities of senior management are clearly defined and documented. Similarly, the roles and responsibilities of the Board and other relevant key functions within the Firm, such as the member of the senior management with responsibility for AML/CFT matters (the "Member of Senior Management", as referred to in section 6.3 below) (where relevant), the Compliance Officer with responsibility for AML/CFT ("Compliance Officer", as referred to in section 6.4 below) (where relevant), the Risk Officer (where relevant), the MLRO (where relevant) and internal audit (where relevant), should also be clearly defined and documented with regard to AML/CFT activities within the Firm.

The Central Bank notes and understands that a custom and practice has evolved in Ireland of using the term "MLRO" to describe a member of staff with certain responsibilities relating to a Firm's AML/CFT obligations, notwithstanding that this term is not defined in Irish legislation. The Central Bank notes that Firms may, depending on the nature, scale and complexity of a Firm's activities, structure their internal AML/CFT governance framework so that a person that has been designated internally as an MLRO may also be the person that is appointed as the Compliance Officer, where such an appointment has been made by the Firm.

6.2 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board

The Central Bank expects the Board to demonstrate effective governance and oversight of the Firm's AML/CFT compliance framework.²¹ This oversight should include, without being limited to, the following measures:

- Business Risk Assessments: The Board should:
 - review and approve the methodology used for undertaking the Firm's Business Risk Assessment.
 - review and approve the Firm's Business Risk Assessment at least on an annual basis to ensure that it is aware of the ML/TF risks facing the Firm and that the corresponding AML/CFT measures which the Firm has in place are appropriate for the level of ML/TF risk identified.
- Policies and Procedures: The Board should review and approve all policies and procedures, and material updates to same.
- Reporting Lines: The Board should ensure that appropriate reporting lines are in place to facilitate the escalation of AML/CFT issues from the Compliance Officer for discussion by the Board. The Compliance Officer should have a mechanism to communicate directly with the Board.
- Board Meetings: The Board should ensure that:
 - AML/CFT issues appear as an agenda item at regular intervals at Board meeting(s) and that the corresponding minutes reflect the level of discussion and outcomes, which took place concerning any Management Information ("MI") provided by the Compliance Officer or any particular AML/CFT issues requiring discussion by the Board.
 - The Compliance Officer delivers a report to the Board at least on an annual basis and that a detailed discussion on its content takes place with a corresponding minute to reflect the level of discussion.
- AML/CFT Resourcing: The Board should ensure that
 - The Firm's AML/CFT function is adequately resourced (both in terms of staff and systems) commensurate with the level of ML/TF risk faced by the Firm.
 - Reviews are undertaken on a regular and timely basis to consider whether the Firm has the appropriate staff numbers, the correct skill-set and whether staff have access to adequate systems and other resources to effectively perform their role as it relates to AML/CFT issues.

Firms should ensure that appropriate evidence of discussions at Board meetings and/or approvals concerning AML/CFT issues are recorded and retained in accordance with the Firm's record retention policy.

²¹Firms must also comply with the Central Bank of Ireland Corporate Governance Requirements relevant to their sector.

6.3 Identification of the Member of Senior Management

"Senior Management" is defined in section 24 of the CJA 2010 as "an officer or employee with sufficient knowledge of the institution's money laundering and terrorist financing risk exposure and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure, and need not, in all cases, be a member of the board of directors".

Section 54(8) of the CJA 2010 provides that designated persons shall appoint a member of Senior Management with primary responsibility for the implementation and management of anti-money laundering measures in accordance with Part 4 if directed in writing to do so by the competent authority for that designated person.

The Central Bank expects Firms to appoint a Member of Senior Management with primary responsibility for implementing, managing and overseeing compliance with AML/CFT measures, where such an appointment is proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of a Firm's activities.

This is a key measure in order to protect the financial system by ensuring that Firms do not attach low priority to AML/CFT issues. A lack of buy-in or understanding of AML/CFT matters at Senior Management level can result in a corporate culture that pursues profits at the expense of a robust compliance framework that is backed by sufficient resources and training. Accordingly, the Central Bank expects that where a Firm is exposed to a significant degree of inherent ML/TF risk, the Firm should consider if it is appropriate for the Member of Senior Management to be a member of the Board.

The Board should ensure that the person so appointed has adequate knowledge, skills and experience regarding the identification, assessment and management of the ML/TF risks, and the implementation of AML/CFT policies, controls and procedures, in addition to a good understanding of the Firm's business model and the sector in which the Firm is operating, and the extent to which this business model exposes the Firm to ML/TF risks.

Where no such appointment has been made by a Firm, the Central Bank may, under Section 54 (8) of the CJA 2010, direct the Firm to do so. In considering whether such a direction is necessary, the Central Bank will have regard to the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm's activities, and in particular the inherent ML/TF risks to which the Firm is exposed.

The obligation set out in Section 54(8) does not apply to an individual that carries on business alone as a designated person.

Where a Firm has decided that it is not necessary to appoint a Member of Senior Management, having regard to the nature, scale and complexities of the Firm's activities, it should record in detail its rationale for such decision. In such circumstances, the Firm must ensure that it remains in compliance with all obligations under the CJA2010. This includes ensuring that all matters requiring approval by senior management are approved at the appropriate level.

6.3.1 Tasks and Role of the Member of Senior Management

The Member of Senior Management has primary responsibility for the implementation and management of AML measures in accordance with the CJA2010. Accordingly, they should ensure that the Board is aware of the impact of ML/TF risks on the activities of the Firm. In effectively discharging this role, the tasks that must be carried out include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Approval of the Business Risk Assessment under section 30A;
- Approval of any PEP relationships under section 37*;
- Approval of any correspondent relationships under section 38*;
- Approval of the Firm's policies, controls and procedures adopted under section 54;
- Ensuring that the Compliance officer:
- (i) has direct access to all the information necessary to perform their tasks;
- (ii) has sufficient human and technical resources to be able to effectively perform the tasks assigned to them; and
- (iii) is well-informed of the AML/CFT-related incidents brought to light by the internal control systems and of the shortcomings in implementing the AML/CFT provisions found by the national and foreign supervisory authorities.

*Dependent on the nature, scale and complexity of a Firm, the volume of PEP and/or correspondent relationships that a Firm is party to may mean that it is not practical for the Member of Senior Management to directly approve each such relationship. In such circumstances, the Member of Senior Management should put in place effective processes to ensure that the decisions as to whether to enter into or continue such relationships are taken at an appropriately senior level. Such processes should also ensure that they are informed before payout of policy proceeds under s37(6A) (where relevant). Such processes should include escalation procedures (including, where appropriate, to the Member of Senior Management), and the provision of quantitative and qualitative Management Information on such relationships to the Member of Senior Management and the Board, and must to subjected to robust assurance testing.

6.4 Appointment of Compliance Officer

Section 54(7) of the CJA 2010 provides that Firms shall appoint an individual at management level, (to be called a 'Compliance Officer') to monitor and manage compliance with, and the internal communication of, internal policies, controls and procedures adopted by the designated person under this section if directed in writing to do so by their competent authority.

The Central Bank expects Firms to appoint a member of staff at management level to monitor and manage compliance with, and the internal communication of, the Firm's internal AML/CFT policies, controls and procedures, to be called a "Compliance Officer", where appropriate having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm's activities.

Where no such appointment has been made by a Firm, the Central Bank may, under Section 54 (7) of the CJA 2010, direct the Firm to do so. In considering whether such a direction is necessary, the Central Bank will have regard to the nature, scale and

complexity of the Firm's activities, and in particular the inherent ML/TF risks to which the Firm is exposed.

The obligation set out in Section 54(7) does not apply to an individual that carries on business alone as a designated person.

Where a Firm has decided that it is not necessary to appoint a Compliance Officer, having regard to the nature, scale and complexities of the Firm's activities, it should record in detail its rationale for such decision. In such circumstances, the Firm must ensure that it remains in compliance with all obligations under the CJA2010.

Firms should ensure that the person appointed as Compliance Officer:

- Has sufficient and appropriate AML/CFT knowledge and expertise, including knowledge of the applicable legal and regulatory AML/CFT framework, and the implementation of AML/CFT policies, controls and procedures;
- Has the autonomy, authority and influence within the Firm to allow them to discharge their duties effectively;
- Is capable of providing effective challenge within the Firm on AML/CFT matters when necessary;
- Has the capabilities, capacity and experience to oversee the identification and assessment of suspicious transactions and to report/liaise with the relevant authorities where necessary in relation to such transactions;
- Sufficient knowledge and understanding of the ML/TF risks to which the Firm is exposed, with relevant experience regarding the identification, assessment and management of such ML/TF risks;
- Keeps up to date with current and emerging ML/TF trends and issues in the industry and understands how such issues may impact the Firm; and
- Has unrestricted and direct access to adequate resources and all information that in the opinion of the Compliance Officer is necessary to allow them to discharge their duties effectively.

The Compliance Officer should have an independent reporting line to the Board. The Compliance Officer should at all times have unrestricted and direct access to all information that in the opinion of the Compliance Officer is necessary to effectively perform their role.

• Is readily accessible to staff on AML/CFT matters.

6.4.1 Compliance Officer Reporting to the Board

Firms should ensure that there is effective reporting and escalation on AML/CFT matters by the Compliance Officer to the Member of Senior Management, and to the Board, as appropriate. Such reporting should include at least:

- Regular and timely Management Information ("MI"), including in relation to any matter
 requiring senior management approval under the CJA2010, regarding the AML/CFT
 activities at the Firm. Such MI should be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the
 Member of Senior Management, and the Board where appropriate, is able to make
 timely, informed and appropriate decisions on AML/CFT matters;
- a "Compliance Officer Report" on the Firm's AML/CFT activities. The Compliance Officer Report should, interalia;
 - Be produced, or reviewed and agreed, by the Compliance Officer at least on an annual basis;
 - o Be presented by the Compliance Officer to the Board in a timely manner;
 - o Be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexities of the Firm's activities;
 - Provide comment upon the effectiveness of the Firm's AML/CFT systems and controls; and
 - o Include recommendations, as appropriate, for improvement in the management of the Firm's ML/TF risk.

6.5 Three Lines of Defence Model

Where Firms have implemented a "three lines of defence" model in order to manage and oversee a Firm's ML/TF risk²², they should ensure that:

- There is adequate and effective co-ordination between the front line business unit, risk, compliance and internal audit, or equivalent within the Firm, to ensure robust and well-structured oversight, as well as effective co-ordination of resources to manage overlap in areas of review;
- The second and third line work plans are prepared using a risk-based approach, with all risks/controls, including AML/CFT, reviewed on a periodic basis;
- Where appropriate, the Member of Senior Management is involved in the planning of the scheduled reviews and in the closing of findings;
- Testing for specific AML/CFT controls, as well as the overall framework, should be conducted on a regular basis commensurate with the risk;
- Effective systems should be used to track and monitor issues to resolution; and
- Risk, compliance and internal audit units are independent and adequately resourced with staff knowledgeable of AML/CFT.

6.6 External Audit

²² Where this is warranted based upon the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm's business

When selecting external auditors, Firms should include consideration of the potential candidate's cognisance of and ability to assess AML/CFT requirements as part of the selection process.

6.7 Policies and Procedures

Section 54 of the CJA 2010 sets out the obligations of Firms in respect of the adoption of policies, controls and procedures and training, the areas to be covered and the responsibilities of senior management in order to prevent and detect the commission of money laundering and terrorist financing.

When developing AML/CFT policies, controls and procedures ("Policies"), Firms should interalia:

- Maintain a detailed documented suite of Policies, which are:
 - o supplemented by guidance and supporting procedures;
 - o accurately reflect operational practices; and
 - fully demonstrate consideration of and compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements;
- Have a clearly defined process in place for the formal review at least annually of the Policies at appropriate levels, with approval where changes are material;
- Review and update Policies in a timely manner in response to events or emerging risks²³; and ensure that such updates are communicated to relevant staff on a timely basis;
- Ensure that Policies are readily available to all staff and are fully implemented and adhered to by all staff;
- Ensure that Policies are subject to review and testing; and
- Ensure that the Member of Senior Management has reviewed and approved all Policies and any material updates to same.

The Regulations of 2019 introduced a new obligation under Section 54. (6A) of the CJA 2010 for Firms to put "...in place appropriate procedures for their employees, or persons in a comparable position, to report a contravention of this Act internally through a specific, independent and anonymous channel, proportionate to nature and size of the designated person concerned."

In complying with this obligation, Firms should clearly document the procedures in place to allow contraventions of the CJA 2010 to be reported internally (either in their Policies, or in more general compliance policies and procedures). Firms should also put in place measures that are proportionate to the nature, sale and complexity of the Firm's business. Examples of measures, which Firms may take in complying with this obligation may include:

 Incorporation into the Firm's existing overarching 'whistleblower' / 'speak up' policies and procedures (i.e. those policies and procedures not solely confined to the obligation contained under Section 54. (6A) of the CJA 2010);

²³ Firms should use version controls for updates to policies and procedures

- The creation of an independent internal reporting framework with clear policies and procedure which is accessible and allows all staff of the Firm to report contraventions of the CJA 2010 anonymously with the appropriate protections afforded; and
- The provision of training and guidance to all staff with regard to complying with the obligation contained under Section 54. (6A) of the CJA 2010.

See also Section 8 of the Guidelines regarding Training.

6.7.1 Group wide policies and procedures

Section 57 of the CJA 2010 sets out the obligation to implement group-wide policies and procedures where a Firm is part of a group.

Section 57 of the CJA 2010 also applies to those Firms who operate a branch, majority-owned subsidiary or establishment outside of the State.

Where applicable, Firms should ensure that they comply with their obligations and the ESA's final draft regulatory technical standards ("RTS") relating to group-wide policies and procedures in third countries.

Such RTS specify how Firms should manage ML/TF risks at group level²⁴ where they have branches or majority-owned subsidiaries based outside the EEA whose laws do not permit the application of group-wide policies and procedures on AML/CFT.

7. Reporting of Suspicious Transactions

7.1 Requirement to Report

Suspicious Transactions Reports ("STRs") play a pivotal role in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Information provided on STRs assist An Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners ("the authorities") in their investigations, resulting in the disruption of criminal and terrorist activities, and can ultimately result in prosecution and imprisonment. STRs also provide authorities with valuable market intelligence on trends and typologies.

Section 42(1) of the CJA 2010, provides that:

"A [Firm] who knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect, on the basis of information obtained in the course of carrying on business as a [Firm], that another person has been or is engaged in an offence of money laundering or terrorist financing, shall report to FIU Ireland and the Revenue Commissioners that knowledge or suspicion or those reasonable grounds."

7.2 Identifying suspicious transactions

When assessing potential suspicious transactions, Firms should consider attempted transactions, as well as completed transactions.

In addition, Firms should note that there is no minimum monetary threshold for reporting and no amount should be considered too low for suspicion. This is particularly important when considering potential terrorist financing transactions, which often involve very small amounts of money.

Firms should consider their specific products, services and customers when making a determination of suspicion, as what might be considered suspicious for one product, service or customer may not be for another. The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of what might raise suspicions:

- Transactions or a series of transactions that appear to be unnecessarily complex, making it difficult to identify the beneficial owner or that do not appear to make economic sense;
- Transaction activities (in terms of both amount and volume) that do not appear to be in line with the expected level of activity for the customer and/or are inconsistent with the customer's previous activity;
- Transactions in excess of a customer's stated income;
- Large unexplained cash lodgements;
- Loan repayments inconsistent with a customer's stated income, or early repayment of a loan followed by an application for another loan;
- Requests for third party payments. For example, this might include a third party making a payment into a customer's account to pay off a loan, to fund an investment or policy, or to fund a savings account;

- Transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions, particularly in circumstances where there is no obvious basis or rationale for doing so;
- Refusal to provide customer due diligence documentation or providing what appears to be forged documentation.

7.3 Timing of Suspicious Transaction Reports ('STRs')

Section 42(2) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to make an STR ... "as soon as practicable..."

'As soon as practicable' means when the Firm acquires that knowledge, forms a suspicion, or acquires those reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering or terrorist financing. This may be before the execution of a transaction, or at the same time as the execution of a transaction, or after a transaction has occurred, depending on the nature of the knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds. In all cases, the Firm should immediately file an STR once a determination of knowledge, a suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect, money laundering or terrorist financing, has been made.

The Firm may need to conduct further analysis and assessment in order to make its determination. Any such analysis and assessment should be conducted without delay, however as soon as the Firm has established knowledge, a suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect, it should immediately file an STR.

7.4 Internal Reporting of Suspicious Transactions

Under Section 44 of the CJA 2010, Firms may allow for the reporting of STRs by way of an internal reporting procedure.

In relation to the identification and escalation of internal reports, Firms should ensure that:

- Operational procedures for staff on filing an internal report ('internal reporting procedures') are adequately documented and that the internal reporting procedure captures all suspicious transaction reporting requirements as prescribed under the CJA 2010. For example the internal reporting procedures should include at least:
 - All required steps for the reporting of suspicions from staff to the MLRO, or any other person(s) charged under the Firm's internal reporting process with investigating suspicions, and from the MLRO to the authorities;
 - The timeframes for escalation of suspicious transactions from when a staff member first identifies a suspicious transaction to when it is raised;
 - Formal acknowledgement by the Firm's MLRO or any other person(s) charged under the Firm's internal reporting process with investigating suspicions raised internally by staff; and
 - Information with regard to 'Tipping-off' so as to ensure that staff are aware of their obligations under the CJA 2010, the penalties for the offence of Tipping Off and that they exercise caution after the filing of an STR²⁵;

²⁵ Please also see section 7.7 below on 'Tipping-off' below.

- AML/CFT training provided to staff includes details on the Firm's internal reporting procedure as well as details on the reporting of suspicions to the authorities;
- There are no discrepancies between internal reporting procedures as documented and operational practices. For example, where the Firm's internal reporting procedure states that suspicions are to be escalated using an internal reporting form then the raising of suspicions should not be conducted verbally;
- Where a Firm utilises a transaction monitoring system ("TMS"), there is regular review of the correlation between alerts generated from the TMS and the reporting of suspicious transactions to the authorities (See also Section 5.3.2 of these Guidelines);
- Where a suspicion has been escalated for further assessment and review, the Firm's records provide sufficient detail of the assessment and adjudication, giving rise to the decision to discount the suspicion or to make a report to the authorities. For example:
 - o The circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion;
 - o The assessment or additional analysis that took place; and
 - The rationale for discounting the suspicion or the basis for making a report to the authorities.
- Sufficient information is retained in order to record the reported suspicion, and support the Firm's determination of whether to discount the suspicion, or to proceed and file the STR with the authorities.

7.5 Making Suspicious Transaction Reports

Section 42 of the CJA 2010, provides that reports in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing suspicions should be made to FIU Ireland and to the Revenue Commissioners.

STRs submitted to FIU Ireland²⁶ should be made via the GoAML application²⁷. Firms should ensure that they are registered with GoAML, as STRs cannot be submitted via GoAML unless the Firm has previously registered.

STRs must also be submitted to the Revenue Commissioners ("Revenue") using Revenue's Online Service (ROS) only. To submit an STR online, a Firm must firstly be registered for ROS²⁸.

Firms should ensure that STRs submitted electronically to FIU Ireland and Revenue are sufficiently detailed to assist the authorities in their analysis and investigations. Guidance on how to submit a STR and selecting the appropriate transaction type can be found by clicking on the "Help" section on the GoAML website.

Examples of poor quality STRs include:

²⁶ which is part of the Garda National Economic Crime Bureau

 $^{^{27}}$ The goAML application is an electronic application which provides FIU Ireland with a central reception point for receiving, processing and analysing STRs

²⁸ For further information please see <a href="https://www.revenue.ie/en/online-services/services/register-for-an-online-service/submit-suspicious-transaction-service/submit-subm

 $[\]underline{reports.aspx\#:} \sim : text = Reporting \% 20 Entities \% 2$

- A lack of clarity as to the reasons for the suspicion. Firms must clearly outline why they are submitting the STR and what transaction(s) they deem to be "suspicious".
- Making reference to a transaction but not providing reasonable details of the specific transaction in the "transaction" field provided;
- Providing Including incorrect customer/client details in the report (e.g.) incorrect date of birth or address is included within the report;
- Selecting incorrect Transaction Types in the report. For example, where there are flows
 of funds, bi-party transactions should be selected. Where no flow of funds has occurred
 but there has been "unusual" activity or an attempt to send funds, or where insufficient
 detail is available on the both parties (i.e. source of funds), multiparty transactions
 should be selected;
- Firms incorrectly grouping multiple transactions as one amount. Exact dates and local amounts of individual transactions should be included in the report;
- Incorrectly stating the transaction location in "Transaction" field. The default transaction location on the GoAML platform is Ireland however, not all locations will be Ireland;
- Failing to include the names of signatories to an account within a report;
- Failing to include the names of both signatories in the "Transaction" field when it's a joint account which is the subject of the report;
- Failing to include the "Entity" name (and the names of directors, if known) in the "Transaction" field when a business account is involved;
- Selecting the incorrect "Transmode Code" in "Transaction" field (e.g.) entering "cash" when the report relates to a "cheque";
- Failing to include cheque information in the "Transaction" field in order to assist in identifying the source of funds;
- Making reference to suspicious debit transactions ((e.g.) large cash withdrawals) without referring to the source of those funds in the "Reason for Suspicion" field (e.g.) cheque lodgement; or
- Inputting "unknown", "not known" etc. in any GoAML field where the details are not known, Firms should continue to leave these fields blank.

Where a STR has been returned to a Firm by FIU Ireland, or by Revenue (due to either incomplete information, the inclusion of an error, or for any other reason), a Firm should take the necessary action required to update the STR, and resubmit the STR to FIU Ireland and Revenue, as soon as practicable.

7.6 Tipping Off

Section 49 of the CJA 2010 provides for two separate but related offences where the Firm (including a representative of a Firm) knows or suspects on the basis of information learned in the course of carrying on business as a Firm:

- that a report has been, or is required to be, made under Chapter 4 of the CJA 2010, the Firm shall not make any disclosure that is likely to prejudice an investigation that may be conducted following the making of a report under Chapter 4; and
- that an investigation is being contemplated or is being carried out into whether an offence of money laundering or terrorist financing has been committed, the Firm shall not make any disclosure that is likely to prejudice the investigation.

Sections 50 to 53 of the CJA 2010 provides for a number of defences for an offence under Section 49 of the CJA 2010 in relation to a disclosure.

Where a Firm or a representative of the Firm²⁹ requests additional information from a customer in relation to a transaction, activity or service, which would not be in keeping with the Firm's expectation for that customer, then as long as such requests have been conducted in a careful and considered manner they should not give rise to an offence under Section 49 of the CJA 2010.

Firms should include details on the offence of 'Tipping-off', the need for staff to exercise caution and the penalties for the offence within the Firm's AML/CFT policies and procedures.

Firms should include as part of their AML/CFT training to all staff, advice around the treatment of unusual transactions and the additional due diligence measures, which should be taken by staff without committing the offence of 'Tipping-off'.

 $^{^{29}}$ A representative of a Firm includes or any person acting, or purporting to act on behalf of the Firm including any agent, employee, partner, director or other officer of the Firm ("representative of the Firm")

8. Training

8.1 AML/CFT Training

Section 54(6) of the CJA 2010 requires Firms to ensure that

"...persons involved in the conduct of the [Firm's] business are—

(a) instructed on the law relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, and

(b) provided with ongoing training on identifying a transaction or other activity that may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing, and on how to proceed once such a transaction or activity is identified."

Having well trained staff who are alert to ML/TF risks is a critically important control for Firms in the detection and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Firms should ensure that all employees, directors and agents are aware of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing relevant to the business, the applicable legislation and their obligations and responsibilities under the legislation.

Firms should provide appropriate and sufficient training, which is tailored to the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm and which is proportionate to the level of ML/TF risk faced by the Firm.

Firms should ensure that all employees, directors and agents:

- Are trained in the Firm's Business Risk Assessment and how it affects their daily work;
- Are trained in relation to the Firm's AML/CFT policy, which should be drafted in clear and unambiguous language;
- Are trained in the Firm's procedures in order that they can recognise and address potential instances of money laundering or terrorist financing;
- Are made aware of the Firm's internal reporting procedures in respect of STRs and the identity and responsibilities of the Firm's MLRO;
- Are made aware of the Firm's internal reporting procedures in respect of contraventions of the CJA 2010, whether this is included within the Firm's existing overarching 'whistleblower' / 'speak up' policies and procedures or, through an independent internal reporting framework of the Firm; and
- Understand their own individual obligations under the CJA 2010 as well as those of the Firm.

8.2 Role Specific and Tailored Training

In addition, Firms should provide AML/CFT training which is specific to the role carried out by the member of staff. For example, front line staff who interact with customers and perform transactions and services should be provided with AML/CFT training relevant to the performance of that role.

Firms should also provide enhanced AML/CFT training tailored to the specific needs of staff who perform key AML/CFT and FS roles within the Firm, for example the Firm's MLRO or senior management responsible for AML/CFT oversight.

Firms should provide staff with ongoing training, especially where a staff member changes role and they may encounter different ML/TF risks to that of their previous role.

8.3 Frequency of Training

Firms should ensure that AML/CFT training is provided to all new recruits upon joining the Firm in a timely manner and to all staff at least on an annual basis thereafter.

Staff in customer facing roles, with responsibilities relating to AML/CFT procedures or controls, should receive AML/CFT training prior to interacting with customers.

Firms should consider the outcomes of their own Business Risk Assessments and whether the frequency and content of AML/CFT training provided is adequate for levels of ML/TF risks faced by the Firm.

Firms exposed to a higher level of ML/TF risk or who have a greater exposure to constantly evolving ML/TF risks should provide training at more frequent and regular intervals if necessary.

8.4 Training Governance

Firms should ensure senior management's oversight and responsibility for:

- The Firm's compliance with its requirements in respect of staff AML/CFT training under the CJA 2010;
- The establishment and maintenance of effective training arrangements which reflect the Firm's Risk Based Approach to AML/CFT; and
- Ensuring that training content is reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure that it remains relevant to the Firm and providing assurance to this effect.

8.5 Training of Outsource Service Providers

Where Firms have outsourced an AML/CFT function, they should ensure that all staff at the outsource service provider performing AML/CFT activities on behalf of the Firm have been appropriately trained on:

- The ML/TF risks relevant to the Firm;
- The applicable AML/CFT legislation; and
- Their obligations and responsibilities under the applicable AML/CFT legislation.

Firms should ensure that relevant staff in the outsourced entity are aware of the Firm's internal reporting procedures in respect of Suspicious Transaction Reporting ("STR") and the identity and responsibilities of the Firm's MLRO.

8.6 Training Channels

Firms should decide the most appropriate method or methods they wish to use in order to provide AML/CFT training to staff, senior management and agents. For example, Firms may decide to use a number of different channels such as online or e-learning modules, classroom training or video presentations in order to fulfil their obligations under the CJA 2010.

8.7 Training Records

Firms should keep a comprehensive record of:

- all staff, senior management and agents who have received AML/CFT training;
- the type of AML/CFT training provided; and
- the date on which the AML/CFT training was provided.

8.8 Training Assessment

Firms should ensure that the AML/CFT training provided includes an assessment or examination during the training session, which should be passed by all participants in order for the AML/CFT training to be recorded as completed. If the training does not contain an assessment or examination, Firms must be in a position to demonstrate effectiveness of training and staff understanding in relation to same.

8.9 Management Information on Training

Firms should ensure that senior management is provided with timely MI including, information on training, training completion and training pass rates.

Firms should ensure that senior management take appropriate remediation action where there are concerns in relation to training issues. Metrics in relation to the Firm's training should be circulated to relevant senior management for Management Information purposes.

9. Record Keeping

9.1 Obligation to retain records

Adequate record keeping is critically important to the preservation of the audit trail, which in turn can assist with any investigation into money laundering or terrorist financing. Effective record keeping allows Firms to demonstrate to the Central Bank the steps, which they have taken to comply with their obligations under the CJA 2010.

Firms should ensure that their AML/CFT policy and procedures contain sufficient detail of their record keeping obligations under the CJA 2010. The adequacy and detail of records kept by a Firm should be reflective of the nature, scale and complexity of the Firm.

Firms should also ensure that all staff including agents and outsourced service providers adhere to the Firm's procedures on record keeping.

9.2 Records a Firm should retain

Firms are required to retain records in relation to the following:

- Business Risk Assessments (under Section 30A. of the CJA 2010);
- Customer Information (under Section 55 (1) of the CJA 2010) including information from relevant trust services as set out in the eIDAS Regulation; and
- Transactions (under Section 55 (3) of the CJA 2010).

Firms should also retain records interalia in relation to the following:

- Internal and external Suspicious Transaction Reports;
- Investigations and suspicious transaction reports;
- Reliance on Third Parties to undertake CDD;
- Minutes of Board meetings;
- Evidence of all matters requiring senior management approval under the CJA 2010;
 - Training; and
- Ongoing monitoring.

9.2.1 Business Risk Assessments

Firms should document and record their Business Risk Assessments, as well as any changes made to Business Risk Assessments as part of a Firm's review and monitoring process, to ensure that they can demonstrate that their Business Risk Assessments and associated risk management measures are adequate.

9.2.2 Customer Information

Firms should keep adequate records, including:

- All documentation and information obtained for the purposes of identifying and verifying a customer, person(s) authorised to act on behalf of the customer and any beneficial owners;
- All customer risk assessments:

- Copies of all additional documentation and information obtained, where EDD measures have been applied to a customer of the Firm. Firms should also ensure that they clearly document their rationale for applying EDD measures;
- Evidence of any sample testing of CDD files, which the Firm has undertaken as part of its assurance testing process; and
- Copies of documentation and information obtained as part of the Firm's ongoing monitoring process.

9.2.3 Transactions

Firms should be cognisant of the importance of the obligations under Section 55 of the CJA 2010 to retain copies of all transactions carried out for or on behalf of a customer during the business relationship with the Firm for their own internal audit purposes as well as any possible investigations by law enforcement.

9.2.4 Internal and External Suspicious Transaction Reports

Firms should keep sufficient records in relation to suspicious transactions, including:

- The circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion;
- Any additional monitoring/assessment that was undertaken;
- Whether the suspicion was reported/not reported, and
- Rationale for reporting or not reporting to FIU Ireland and the Revenue Commissioners.

Firms should retain copies of all documentation and information used as part of any internal assessment into a customer following on from the filing of an internal STR by a staff member of the Firm.

Firms should retain records to provide evidence and the justification behind their decision whether or not to file an STR with FIU Ireland and the Revenue Commissioners. In this regard, Firms should also retain copies of the supporting documentation and information, which assisted them in reaching their decision.

9.2.5 Reliance on Third Parties to Undertake CDD

Firms should ensure, when placing reliance on third parties to undertake CDD, that there is a written arrangement in place between the Firm and the third party provider with clear contractual terms in respect of the obligations of the third party to obtain and maintain the necessary records, and to provide the Firm with CDD documentation or information as requested.

9.2.6 Minutes of Board Meetings

Firms should retain all records of discussions and decisions made at Board level in relation to:

- How the requirements of the CJA 2010 were assessed and implemented; and
- Any AML/CFT issues as they arise on an on-going basis.

9.2.7 Evidence of matters requiring senior management approval

Firms should ensure that appropriate evidence is retained in accordance with its record retention policy regarding the Firm's obligations in relation to all matters requiring senior management approval under the CJA2010.

9.2.8 Training

Firms should retain records of all AML/CFT training provided to staff during a given year. Information should include:

- The dates on which AML/CFT training was provided to staff;
- Attendance and sign-in sheets (where relevant) of who received the AML/CFT training;
- The nature and content of the AML/CFT training provided; and
- Results of the assessment and examination during the training session.

9.2.9 Ongoing Monitoring

Firms should retain records to verify and evidence the on-going monitoring conducted by the Firm, including the monitoring of transactions, the results of such monitoring and decisions taken on foot of on-going monitoring.

9.3 Assurance Testing of Record Retention

Firms should perform assurance testing at appropriate intervals to ensure the quality and legibility of documents held and that records are being retained and/or destroyed in line with the Firms' policy and the relevant legislative provisions.

Section 55(7A) of the CJA 2010 provides that

"The records required to be kept by a [Firm] under this section may be kept outside the State provided that the [Firm] ensures that those records are produced in the State to—

- (a) a member of the Garda Síochána,
- (b) an authorised officer appointed under Section 72,
- (c) a relevant authorised officer within the meaning of Section 103, or
- (d) a person to whom the designated person is required to produce such records in relation to his or her business, trade or profession,

as soon as practicable after the records concerned are requested, or

where the obligation to produce the records arises under an order of a court made under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice Act 1994, within the period which applies to such production under the court order concerned"

Where identification records are held outside of the State, it is the responsibility of the Firm to ensure that the records available meet the necessary requirements under the CJA 2010.

Firms should be aware that no secrecy or data protection legislation should restrict access to the records either by the Firm on request, or by An Garda Síochána under court order or relevant mutual assistance procedures. If it is found that such restrictions exist, copies of the underlying records of identity should, wherever possible, be sought and retained within the State.

Firms should take account of the scope of AML/CFT legislation in other countries, and should ensure that records kept in other countries that are needed by the Firm to comply with Irish legislation are retained for the required period.

10. International Financial Sanctions

10.1 Financial Sanctions Framework

Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature, which seeks to bring about a change in activities or policies, such as violations of international law or human rights or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles.

Financial sanctions emanate from the EU and the United Nations ('UN') and are contained in sanctions lists.

EU Sanctions Regulations carry the following legal obligations:

- Prohibit making funds available, directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of individuals or entities listed on an EU Sanctions List
- Prohibit specific trade / financial transactions with certain countries
- Freeze all funds and economic resources of persons and entities on sanctions lists
- Report to the relevant competent authority (the Central Bank of Ireland) in respect of financial sanctions true hits³⁰ and any freezing of accounts or transactions

10.1.1 UN Sanctions

The UN imposes financial sanctions and requires UN Member States to implement them through Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. Up to date information on UN Financial Sanctions can be found on the UN website:

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information

The consolidated UN Sanctions Committees list relating to terrorism can be found at the following link:

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/un-sc-consolidated-list

10.1.2 EU Sanctions

The EU implements financial sanctions imposed by the UN. It does this through EU regulations, which have direct legal effect in Ireland and all EU Member States. The EU can also impose its own financial sanctions, sometimes referred to as 'EU autonomous' sanctions. These are also implemented through regulations that have direct effect in Ireland and EU Member States. Up to date information on EU Financial Sanctions can be found on the EU website:

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/423/sanctions-policy en

The consolidated list of EU sanctions can be found at the following link:

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions en

 $^{^{30}}$ Where Firms are satisfied that the person/Firm has been listed as a sanctioned person/entity pursuant to applicable EU Financial Sanctions Legislation

The Central Bank website also includes up to date information on EU financial sanctions with links to the most up to date EU financial sanctions list for searching purposes. It also includes recent updates to the EU financial sanctions list.

https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-the-financing-of-terrorism/countering-the-financing-of-terrorism

10.2 Role of the Central Bank

The Central Bank is one of three competent authorities with responsibility in relation to financial sanctions in Ireland.

The other Irish competent authorities are the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

True sanctions hits should be reported to the Central Bank using the following email address - sanctions@centralbank.ie

The Central Bank is obliged to report financial sanctions true hits to the European Commission and FIU Ireland.

10.3 Financial Sanctions Obligations on Firms

There is a legal obligation to comply with EU Council Regulations relating to financial sanctions as soon as they are adopted.

Once a person or entity has been sanctioned under EU Financial Sanctions, there is a legal obligation not to transfer funds or make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to that person or entity.

In the event that a match or a 'hit' occurs against a sanctioned individual or entity, Firms must immediately freeze the account and/or stop the transaction and immediately report the hit to the Central Bank along with other relevant information. In certain circumstances, Firms can make a transfer to a sanctioned individual or entity if a prior authorisation is received or notification is given to a competent authority.

All persons must supply any information related to suspected financial sanctions breaches to the Central Bank pursuant to the relevant EU Council Regulations.

10.3.1 Financial Sanctions Governance

Firms should ensure that senior management are fully aware of the Firm's obligations in the area of financial sanctions. It should also be clear, who at the Firm has responsibility for financial sanctions. This individual should be of sufficient seniority in order to discharge the Firm's responsibilities.

10.3.2 Financial Sanctions Risk Assessment

Firms should ensure the Business Risk Assessment takes into account their obligations under financial sanctions regulations. In particular, Firms should pay particular attention to the risk factors outlined in section 4 of these Guidelines.

10.3.3 Screening Customers against Sanctions Lists

Firms should have effective screening systems appropriate to the nature, size and risk of their business.

Screening new and existing customers and payments against the relevant and up to date EU and UN lists helps ensure that Firms will not breach the sanctions regulations. Customer screening should take place at the time of customer take-on and at regular intervals thereafter.

10.3.4 Matches and escalation

Where a customer's name matches a person on the relevant lists, Firms should take steps to identify whether a name match is real or if it is a 'false positive', (for example; a customer has the same or similar name but is not the same person).

Firms should have procedures that look at a range of identifier information such as name, date of birth, address or other customer data.

Firms should have clear escalation procedures in place to be followed in the event of a positive match.



